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Abstract
The objective of this dissertation is to analyse what kind of orientation/guidance in relation to
the  common  good  people  express  in  public  ethics  contexts,  what  kind  of  individual
differences there may be in those orientations and other individual aspects which may be
connected to the different orientation expressed. 
To do that in the first study it is presented a practical method for assessing the different
orientations to the common good in social situations, through the construction of the
Orientation to the Common Good Questionnaire (OCGQ). The instrument is based on story
dilemmas – designed to elicit moral judgment and to invoke a conflict between the different
orientations  to  the  common  good  hypothesised  –  using  a  mixed-method  that  links
quantitative  and  qualitative  data  –  matching  recognition  and  production  measure.  The
questionnaire displays an high inter-rater reliability, showing an efficiency of the coders
training system used and proving the questionnaire to be a practical measure that can be
scored reasonably quickly and reliably.
The second study, in order to explore the validity of the instrument, explored the relations of
the orientation to the common good with  socio-moral reasoning –  intended as the main
reference construct for the measurement – and some demographic theoretically relevant
variables.  The  OCGQ  achieves  acceptable  association  with  Socio-moral  Reflection
Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) and it was found a difference in orientation to the common
good in favour of women. The findings underline socio-economic status as a prerequisite for
the development of a more mature orientation to the common good, but not sufficient for the
development of a higher level of common good.
The third study – referring to both positive moral functioning and negative moral functioning
– tested the relationships between different kinds of value, civic participation and civic moral
disengagement and orientation to the common good expressed.
Relying on Schwartz’s theory on basic human values, the results confirm as key personal
values both self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence) and self-enhancement
values  (power  and  hedonism).  The findings  related  to  civic  moral  disengagment –
consistent with the expectations based on Bandura’s moral disengagement theory – confirm
the more people deactivated their internal moral control the more they denied high level
orientations  towards  the  common  good.   Finnally,  also  civic  engagement showed  a
positive correlation with oreintations to the common good.  
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CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
a. CONTEXT AND ISSUES. 
This  dissertation  project  stems  from  the  author’s  experience  as  a
psychologist in the Guardia di Finanza, referring to two crucially important
aspects for the institutional purposes of such a police organization. On one
hand, the soldiers’ moral understanding of the complex situations they are
called upon to manage, and on the other the ability of officers to constantly
direct their actions for the good of the whole community.  In the selection
process,  the  Organization  is  strongly  aware  of  the  need that  new entry
human resources  are driven by a strong intrinsic orientation towards the
common good, evidencing an ability to “perceive that the collective identity
predominates over that  individual”.
The central point of such issues is the importance, for society and for each
individual, that adults – especially those who hold specific institutional roles
–  be  morally  concerned  about  public  social  questions,  not  only  in  their
immediate environment,  but  everywhere  else in  the world,  when events,
decisions, and policies carry moral consequences.
It is possible to start with two converging concerns (Blasi, 2009).
First,  in  addition  to  the  domain  of  family  and  friends,  people  are  also
engaged in the world of work and in the public issues of their communities
and  of  the  entire  planet.   The  person’s  field  of  action  is  of  crucial
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importance.   While  there  is  too  much  attention  paid  to  daily  human
interaction (frequent kindness within the family and with friends; courtesy
with strangers; charity towards the beggar; mutual help, honesty, and trust)
there  seems  to  be  widespread  indifference  or  inattention  to  the  moral
implications of the ways society at large and social institutions operate, and
of the ways each of  us functions in society.   From this point  of  view,  it
seems undeniable that there is an excessive restriction of morality to one’s
private  world  or  to  strictly  interpersonal  issues.   In  the  present  work,
therefore, the focus is on people compared “not – exclusively – with groups
of people who know and care for one another”, but with the “more faceless
group of which we are all members – our community, our nation, even our
species” (Batson, 1994) (Figure 1).
Figure 1.
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Second,  many  such  situations,  from  a  moral  perspective  are  complex,
ambiguous, cognitively and motivationally difficult. Therefore, the daily life of
ordinary mature adults is filled with  situations and encounters within  the
public sphere (related to the world of work, and social, legal, and political
institutions)  that  present  opportunities,  and  sometimes  the  necessity,  to
make moral judgments and engage in moral choices.
Consequently,  the  following  interrelated  aspects  are  of  fundamental
importance in such situations (Blasi, 2009):
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• awareness of the moral implications of one’s adult roles – in one’s
employment and profession (including issues of professional ethics), in
one’s community (as a citizen), in one’s society and in the world, the
mature adult must be able to abstract social roles and their functions
from the individual characteristics (including the moral views) of those
who occupy such roles (and from the personal relationships one has
with such people);
• understanding  of  the  common  good,  and  of  its  primacy  over
individual  interests  -   the  person  (within  the  broad  shared  social
context) is steadily called to  “common good” reasoning, reflecting on
the  dialectical  relationship  between  diverse  co-existing  interests  and
establishing what is the most important belief.
The concept of  the “common good” and what people identify as the
“common good”  is,  in  fact,  of  central  importance  for  this  doctoral
dissertation.   There  is  no  clear  cut  definition.   Rather,  the  concept
requires that a person not only sees that there is  “good”, but that
such  good is “common” or rather “good also for the other” (more or
less proximate), and therefore represents a good “also for himself”
as  a  participant  in  the  group or  society.   In  this  sense,  then,  the
concept of  common good is closely connected with the  awareness (or
not) of the person in his  playing a role, as a citizen, in the broad
social  context.    So,  as has been explained in detail  in  the following
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sections,  the  concept  of  “common  good”  expands  and  restricts
considerably in relation to the social structures to which the person
refers and which includes himself (his family, his restricted community,
his nation and, in a broader sense, the global supranational community).
From such an understanding of common good and from the awareness of
participation in the large public good as a moral responsibility (Narvaez,
2010)  derives  part  of  the  sense  of  citizenship  and   relative  civic
obligations.
b. SIGNIFICANCE. 
The identification of these issues is reflected in a multiplicity of reasons
present in the wider debate and are essentially due to three main aspects.
First, the evidence of  an increasingly complex world which requires
the individual to constantly deal with  increasingly diverse “public”
situations.  This involves the making of increasingly more difficult
and articulated choices at the individual level and therefore requires
a  “morally  mature”  subject.   The  understanding  of  public  ethics
situations collides with this great complexity resulting from the effects of
both modern technology and globalization.  It is true in fact that “the world
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faces unprecedented challenges that require mature moral  responses if
widespread death and destruction are to be avoided, never before has the
world faced global peril of the complexity and magnitude of today including
climate  instability,  unsustainable  population  growth,  economic  systems,
and resource use” (Narvaez, 2010).  Now we live in a globalized society in
which the action of one group affects that of another group on the other
side  of  the  world.   Consequently,  the  defining  of  a  mature  moral
functioning  for  today’s  world  may  require  incorporating  not  only  the
effective moral practices of  the majority of traditionalist societies around
the world (Fry, 2006), but also skills required for global citizenship (Cogan,
1997), to ensure that humanity continues to flourish (Korten, 2006).
Bauman (2001)  is  the  author  who more  than  anyone  has tried  to
analyse  this  complexity,  underlining  that  nowadays  people  are  faced
with  increasing identity  issues related to  the different  social  levels  and
contexts in which they, as individuals, are simultaneously inserted at an
individual, local and global level.  Moving from the well-known studies of
Hans Jonas,  he (Bauman,  1993)  pointed  out  that  “the  range of  every
consequences of the actions have exceeded by far the moral imagination
of the authors (L) the morality we have inherited from the pre-modern
time is a morality of proximity and so unfit in such a society in which every
important action is a distance action”.  
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Second,  the  peculiarity  of  the  Italian situation:  sociological  analysis
(and  others)  seem  to  indicate  a  general  lack  of  public  ethics  that
highlights,  in particular,  the primacy of  the familistic and the individual
over community logic;  reference is made to  “amoral familism”  as “the
inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or, indeed,
for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear
family” (Banfield, 1958) – and to the recent studies of Paul Ginsborg that,
from the point of view of historical and sociological reflection, focused on
the institution of the family in relation to the state and civil society, in which
he  stresses  that  “in  Italy  today”  we  see  the   “prevalence  of  vertical
organization  between  patron  and  client  over  the  horizontal  between
citizens.   In  this  way  the  relationship  with  the  “powerful”  becomes
fundamental as it is this which guarantees some form of access for you
and your children; hence a bond of gratitude and servitude.   All this has
nothing to do with citizenship, rights and democracy” (Ginsborg, 1998);
Third,  the increasingly explicit  social  demand for  an “ethic  of  the
common good”  and,  in  particular,  the  training  and  orientation  of
young people to the common good in their daily activities. Halstead
and Pike (2006) emphasize the centrality of morality to citizenship and Bull
(2006) clearly states this interrelationship of morality and citizenship: “civic
education is certainly a kind of moral education in that it promotes and
supports  a  public  morality,  that  is,   agreement  about  the  principles
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governing citizens’  relationships  and  obligations  to  one  another”.   Plus
there are differences in emphasis, as citizenship educators tend to be less
interested in personal morality and more in public morality (Sehr, 1997;
Bull,  2006).  Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  character  education  includes
methods  compatible  with  the  need  for  promoting  autonomous  critical
thinkers (Halstead & Pike, 2006) who feel a moral obligation to serve the
common good (Bull, 2006).  By the time the broad social issues become
relevant to the adult, his formal and informal moral education has already
terminated, and many adults are unprepared to acknowledge new moral
responsibilities (Blasi, 2009).
c. QUESTIONS.
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Starting from the context and the issues further identified, the dissertation
is addressed to an important challenge concerning the questions:  “How
do people respond to, evaluate, and attempt to resolve the moral issues
that  arise in  such public  contexts?.   How do people  perceive  complex
public  ethics situations  that  involve  the  common  good?”,  “What  is
important for people in such situations?.
Moving from these more overarching questions, the specific goal of this
research is to  study what kind of orientation/guidance in relation to
the common good people express in these public ethics contexts,
what  kind  of  individual  differences  there  may  be  in  those
orientations, and other individual aspects which may be connected
to the different orientation expressed.
d.  THEORETICAL  ASSUMPTION  AND  METODOLOGICAL
CHOICES.
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.
In  dealing  with  such  issues  it  was  necessary  to  make  some  starting
choices.
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First, it is clear that  in complex public ethics situations the orientation to
the common good can derive from two main characteristics: a) structural
aspect, that  supposes the person builds fundamental concepts, such as
social  relationships,  society,  and  the moral  criteria  used to  orientate  in
such  circumstances;  these  social  and  moral  criteria  are  organized,  for
each person, according to a logic,  or a mental structure (Piaget,  1965;
Kohlberg,  1976);  b)  specific  aspect,  based  on  the  internalization  of
prevailing  cultural  norms,  opinions,  etc.;  the  social-learning  perspective
(Torney-Purta, 2010).   
These characteristics,  of  course,  are  not  incompatible.   All  people
have a logic but it is not the only one, since people are constantly exposed
to beliefs (through internet, TV, newspapers, etc).   In this sense, then, not
all  decisions  are  based  on  logic  but  are  often  based  on  beliefs  used
automatically by the individual.   The choice made for the present work
has  been  pretty  clear,  deciding  to  refer  specifically  to  the  structural
aspects.
A second fundamental assumption – strictly consequential to the first – is
relative to  the active role of the person in building his own internal
logic, having regard to the fundamental interaction of the person with
reality.  The structural approach, in fact, looks at the person composed of
several  structures  –  differing  from the  “elementaristic”  approach that
refers to  the  single disconnected element – with a cohesion and internal
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logic.   One  could  not  make  sense  of,  or  even  imagine,  this  complex
development  process  of  internal  structures,  without  recognising  the
essential  role  of  society  and  culture.   It  is  incontrovertible  that
individuals are born into an already constituted culture characterised by
specific moral beliefs and values.   What is not obvious is how the role of
sociocultural  factors  should  be  understood,  how  does  a  person
typically end up  adopting his or her society’s values or how does
society use its power on its members. Such questions are relevant from
the present work and for the comprehension of the common good in public
ethics situations. It is necessary to start from a clear idea of  the active
role of the person in such a process of internalization, having an idea
about the relations between roles and cultural norms and self-concepts.
In  relation  to  that  question  it  is possible  to  refer  to  three  different
approaches:
• the anthropological and sociological point of view (Vygotsky, 1978),
according to which  the logic and the structures of the person
fully  reflects  the  structure  of  society,  being  an  ideal
isomorphism between individual consciousness and culture –
society provides all  of the contents (cultural benefits and values)
and  the  impetus  (educational  efforts  in  various  forms).
Internalization  does  not  simply  consist  of  transferring  external
meanings  into  a  pre-existing  individual  consciousness;  rather,
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internalization is conceived as the very formation of individual
consciousness, its form and contents, reflecting the form and
structure of society, without an active involvement by the person;
• the  constructive  perspective of  Piaget  and  Kohlberg  that
underlined  an  active  intervention  of  the  person  in  external
experience assimilation processes.   According to this approach
each  person  builds his  own  structures  (so  that  each  one  builds
them in a different way from the other) but such  construction is
unconscious, so that it is not possible to think  of freedom of the
people  beyond  the  structures.   Such  an  understanding  of
internalization  and  assimilation,  too,  have  rendered  socialized
individuals  incapable  of  engaging in  any real  social  critique  and
therefore  incapable  of  being  autonomously motivated  to  pursue
social and moral projects;
• finally,  there  is  a  point  of  view  that  looks to  morality  as  a
characteristic  of  the person rather  than reasoning (Taylor,  1989)
and that looks to the sense of self as essential to explain moral
commitment  and the  translation of  moral  beliefs  into  action
(Blasi,  1980;  1983;  1993).    From such a perspective, over  the
unconscious  activity  there  is  a  conscious  reflection  that
consists –  substantially  –  in  the  option  for  the  person  to
question their own structures and logic (Blasi, 2001).
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The  present  dissertation  refer  to  the  importance  of  the  last
theoretical  option.  Following Blasi  (2001),  in  fact,  it  is  argued  that  a
critical autonomous morality is only possible when a person has, to some
extent, his own grasp of moral reality and the capacity to defend it against
external pressures.  The mature capacity of appropriating the moral values
of  his culture,  of  responsibly taking them over, and investing  his life in
them  necessarily  implies  the  capacity  of  distancing  himself  from  his
society, the possibility of being critical, and of even rejecting the values of
his culture.   These two related capacities require in the person the sense
of an individual self, experienced as different from the society to which he
belongs  and  to  some  extent  autonomous  with  respect  to  socialization
pressures.    Such  abilities  are  fundamental  and  depend  on  the
chances and the degree of reflection that people have with respect to
their assumptions, their own logic.   Many people (probably the majority
of individuals) do not reflect on their moral assumptions.  So that when
they are asked what they think about their own beliefs, they can only offer
an obvious unreflected  answer.   In  contrast,  others,  are  able  to  justify
them,  being  able  to  express  a  reasoning.   This  differentiation  is  of
fundamental relevance for the purposes of the current study.
2. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS.
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Those general theoretical perspectives have determined, therefore, both
the theoretical assumptions of departure and the resulting methodological
choices adopted.
The theoretical framework is based on “Cognitive developmentalism”
(Mead, Baldwin, Piaget, Kohlberg and Selman). The differences between
the various versions and detailed aspects of the different authors are not
so important for the present work.   However, it is essential to refer to the
fundamental theoretical principles that are accepted by the various
versions and that constitute the general framework for the present work:
(a)  construction by any person of  fundamental  concepts,  such as
social  relationships,  friendship,  society,  moral  criteria;  (b)  these
social and moral criteria are organized for each person depending on
a logical, or a mental structure;  (c) these mental structures develop
and change gradually with  development, thus forming a hierarchy of
stages or level; (d) the main stimulus for social and moral development is
the  need  to  understand,  to  make sense  of  the  reality  and  experience
encountered;  that  is,  to  solve  the  cognitive  problem,  rebalance  one’s
understanding;  (e) if  the human reality,  in  its essence, is similar  in the
various societies, the hierarchy of levels of understanding social and moral
should be universal.
According  to  this  perspective,  therefore,  the  person’s  understanding,
his logic, his basic criteria, are indicated by reasons he gives for his
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opinions,  judgments,  decisions,  etc.  and  then  by  reasoning. This
group of theories, then, provides ideas and data on the development of
social and moral understanding, offering a way to address the issue of the
common good.
The starting theoretical assumptions are as follows:
- situations and decisions relating to  the common good can be
very often the subject of moral judgment;
- common  good  behaviour  does  not  always  reflect  elevated  moral
reasoning – a person could respect national norms in order to avoid
punishment, for example – but what is important is the reasons and
judgments  connected  to  the  orientation  to  the  common  good
expressed;
- these moral judgments depend on what people believe to be the
common  good,  the  value  that  is  given  to  the  common  good
compared to other values;
- orientation towards the common good of people in social public ethics
situations can have various levels, from the lowest and specific to
the highest and universal;
- the expression of a certain orientation is connected with the ability to
take the perspective of others, i.e. with “other” different social groups
for extension; the framework is that there are social groups (the family,
the small community, the state, the whole of humanity)  that refer to
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objective  social  structures  that  are  “subjectively”  and  only
gradually understood by each individual, with the understanding
of the rules governing the various interactions and determining
the role of each person in the group;
- the various orientations are not mutually exclusive but overlap
and coexist in the same person, so a particular level is not reached
once  and  for  all  but  the  person  can  express  simultaneously
orientations more or less elevated, resulting, however, characterized
by a prevailing attitude. 
The understanding of the common good, as it is understood in the study,
therefore,  seems to  be  a  result  of  the  individual  understanding  of  the
“social structure” in which the person is located, as well as the position of
the person within such social structures.
It is assumed that there are  four basic types of common good. This
hypothesis is based on various types of “social structure” and the way
in which an individual participates in the same.   For “social structure”
it is meant, in a nutshell, the articulation of status, roles and institutions in
which individuals live in groups, creating relations and systems of varying
complexity.   The social structure is, in a few words, the frame within which
– and thanks to which – social actions take place.
The four main orientations hypothesized in the perception of the common
good:
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a. personal and familiar interest – the reference is to the good of himself,
to a concrete norm of reciprocity, which gives rise to a strictly personal
sense of responsibility.  Even if a purely personal egocentric orientation
is very different from a family orientation, for reasons of simplicity, the
interest of the individual and the family are treated as a single interest.
The reasons for keeping them together in this study are: (a) the close
identification  of  personal  and  family  interest  based  on  emotional
relatiionships  etc.,  (b)  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing in  practice  when
family interest is used as real reason or as rationalization for one’s own
interest. Family interest, covering the family and close circle of friends
(assimilated to the family),  refers to social structures characterized by
strictly personal and emotional relationships, with history and memories
in  common,  so  much  to  be  heard  effectively  and  affectively  as  well
personnel; 
b. group interest – refers to groups limited in extension (the small country,
the association, etc.,) or competence (the company for which one works,
parish,  etc,,)  that  are characterized by the absence of  deep “face-to-
face” interpersonal relationships, but that are often the principle of felt
and perceived identity;; what matters is the limitation of interests and not
the face-to-face aspect
c. national interest – refers to the state, the country as a whole, made up
of laws and structures that operate in an abstract and anonymous mode,
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so that what matters is the role and not the person that covers it; we are
no  longer  into  the  concrete  interactions,  but  rather  in  the  context  of
abstract institutions, defined according to relations based on equity and
justice,  duties  and  responsibilities,  all  of  which  are  related  to  the
belonging to the broader social structure of the nation, and hence our
participation in order to contribute to the benefit of all; the main idea is
that a nation is the largest social structure, encompassing all the others,
regulated by general norms and laws and institutions, which is not the
case of global interests. 
d. global  interest –  characterized  by  a  basic  difference  compared  to
previous orientations, not being linked to groups and, therefore, to social
structures in the strict sense: there is not a specific supranational reality
that  forms  a  real  supranational  society  covering  all  nations;   in  this
sense, there is orientation to global concerns, i.e. universal goods, some
of which are really universal and others which respond to the principle of
ideal reciprocity; supranational reality comprises all  people, purely on
the basis of their belonging to the human race; often, sensitivity to the
needs of the world and of the human community as such do not receive
impetus from the concept of the common good, but rather from a sense
of  humanity, altruism and compassion, indeed, it is crucial to keep these
aspects     separate.
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In sum, there is a hierarchy of expanding interests, at each step underlined
by a wider good that is truly common. There are two important transitions:
from egocentrism to perspective taking; from a concrete perspective taking
(face-to-face) to an abstract perspective-taking; in steps two and three there
are  social  structures  with  roles,  norms,  expectations,  each  time  the
structure encompassing the lower ones.
The differences can be the understanding of the concept and in the
understanding of the common good as the object of moral obligation.
A person may also understand that there is a common good exceeding his
own individual interests or those of his family but such a “transcendent
good” does not produce a sense of moral obligation. Or, it may well be that
the moral obligation is understood and accepted at the level of the family
or small group, but not at the level of the nation.   So people could be
differentiated on the basis of these two dimensions, the understanding of
the concept or the understanding of moral obligation.
In  order  to  choose the  common good in  a  specific  situation,  one
must not only understand it, but must be able to apply in the specific
case,  and  must  also  understand  the  importance  and  personal
obligation to do so.   From such a standpoint, one thing is to understand
some “common good”, another issue is to be able to express it, and quite
another thing still is to express it in such a way that those who observe the
person (or interprets what the person says) realize that the object of which
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he  speaks  is  a  common  good  for  him.  Essentially,  complete
comprehension of the common good is the outcome of a mature capacity
to appropriate the moral values of one’s social group, and of being
able to sense it autonomously with  respect  to  socialization pressures.
The  apex  of  moral  commitment  to  the  common good  is  to  desire  the
morally  good  in  the  same  way  one  desires  what  satisfies  one’s  most
intimate and deepest needs.   For example, it is not enough to understand
that the law is good for a given society or community, it is also necessary
to understand that the law, in itself,  is good for the person; or to talk about
“common good”, it is not enough to understand that peace in the family is
an objective good, or (for a child) that the tranquillity of his father is good
for the father, they become  “common good” within the sphere of the family
if the person understands that peace in the family and the tranquillity of his
father are common goods, and therefore goods for himself.  In this sense,
then, the idea is that only if the person understands this aspect can he
really want them, recognizing the same as a common good.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
THE FIELD OF REASEARCH RELATED 
TO THE COMMON GOOD 
30
INTRODUCTION
Before presenting the current research work, it is appropriate to provide
the  psychological  research  context  for  this  dissertation.  As
highlighted  in  the  previous  chapter,  starting  from  the most  general
theoretical assumptions it is developed the concept of common good, and
suggested  several  possible  orientations  to  the common good in  public
ethic situations.   These basic assumptions  also led the methodological
approach  used  in  formulating  the questionnaire,  as  explained  in  the
following three studies.  From this standpoint, a difficulty arose in dealing
with these issues given the absence of psychological studies directly
addressed to the common good.  It was not possible to move from an
object  of  study,  definitions,  much  less  instruments  already  clearly
delineated.  Rather, the study started from the identification of concrete
31
examples  in  everyday situations and then  move to translate the starting
questions and observations into theoretical and methodological choices.
The fundamental hypothesis of this work is that awareness of the moral
implications  of  our  adult  roles  plays  a  crucial  role  in  orientation
towards the common good.   Such a mature consciousness is directly
connected to the ability to take the perspective of others, referring not
only to the “other” that is more or less known but to different and
progressively  broader  social  groups through extension (the  family,
the  small community, the state, the whole  of  humanity).   In  developing,
the  person  takes  part  in  this  social  group  and  matures  such  an
understanding of the rules, governing the various interactions, and
the role of each person in the group.   The different orientations to
the common good are, essentially, nothing more than  different social
group perspectives – that refer to different values, principles and rules –
acquired  by  people  in  different  ways,  more  or  less  reasoned and
actively appropriated.    These differences are reflected in the diverse
ways of expressing the same orientations to the common good.
Therefore,  the  main  reference  point  are  the  studies  on  Perspective
taking.  This is recognized as one of  the most important  capabilities of
individuals  in  interaction  with  their  social  contexts  (Piaget,  1928,  1963,
1976; Piaget & Inhelder, 1963; Flavell,  1968; Light, 1979; Sarbin, 1954;
Selman,  1980).  Taking  another  person’s  and,  more  widely,  a group’s
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perspective and integrating it with one’s own perspective is fundamental to
interpersonal  and  social  understanding;  to  how  one  interprets  and
functions within the social  world and to prosocial wider interaction. The
construct of perspective taking was once seen to be a foundational activity
for the development of self and other understanding in children (Flavell et
al.,  1968;  Light,  1979;  Piaget,  1928,  1963,  1976;  Piaget  &  Inhelder,
1948/1963; Sarbin, 1954; Selman, 1980).  However, over the course of the
middle  to  late  twentieth  century,  it  lost  its  top  billing  in  developmental
psychology. However, a large number of recent works on the development
of  self-consciousness  and  agency  (Russell,  1996;  Hobson,  2002;
Gillespie,  2005,  2006;  Martin,  2005,  2006)  may  indicate  a  research
reappearance in perspective taking.
In  particular,  the  focus  is  on  the  developmental  theory  of  perspective
taking originally advanced by  Robert Selman (1974, 1975, 1980).   He
created a model that describes the advance of social perspective taking
from  early  childhood  to  early  adulthood,  looking at the  qualitative
transformations in people social cognition.  In dealing with Selman’s it
was first revisited an  earlier orientation to perspective taking – in the
pioneering work of George Herbert Mead (1934, 1938) and Jean Piaget
(1928,  1976)  –  going  through  Kohlberg’s developmental-structural
approach,   to  Selman’s  extensions  taking  framework  to  mature
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perspective (beyond  mid-adolescence  into  adulthood)  and  to  Blasi’s
theory on moral character (Blasi, 1991, 1995).
The work especially focused on the manner in which rules and values
are appropriated, addressing the attention to the central role of the
self  as  subject  and  to  the  forms  it  takes  through  development
influencing the person’s broader social exchanging.  Such theories,
actually,  have  had  the  advantage  of  enabling to  see  how  the
coordination of perspectives informs the ways in which individuals
situate  themselves  in  relation  to  their  broader  communities,
construct  their  social  identities,  make  ideological  commitments
(Youniss & Yates, 1997) and, ultimately,  interface with the issues that
have to do with the common good.  In the following paragraphs is paid
attention in particular to three aspect: 1) the role assigned to the concept
of perspective taking – considering the different levels/stages related to
large  social  groups;  2)  the  role  played  by  social  experience  in  the
development of perspective taking; 3) the active modes of internalization
of values and rules, looking at the awareness of the moral implications of
one’s  mature roles;  4)  the method used  in the development  of  such a
social perspective taking.
a. MEAD AND PIAGET.
Selman  (1969;  1975b;  1980)  situates  his  core  model  as  theoretically
informed by the earlier work of George Herbert Mead and Jean Piaget.
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The earlier work of Mead (Mead, 1932, 1934, 1938) is fundamental for the
development of the perspective taking model.  He (Mead, 1903) proposed
a conception of reality understood as a field of  perspectives, describing
how our minds move between the perspectives within social problems.   In
thinking, we are seeking to combine and integrate perspectives.  Thus,
it is not only the ability to think through a situation in terms of various
perspectives,  but  also the ability to integrate and coordinate them.
With respect to those aspects, Mead focused in particular on the dynamic,
constitutive  relations  that  he  believed  were obtained  between  the
collective perspectives and coordination of particular social groups
and  the  perspectives  of  individual  members  of  those  groups.
Through taking and coordinating perspectives with other social objects in
the  world the  subject  emerged  as  a  person  with  a  social  and
psychological  identity,  rational  and  moral  agency,  and  social
competence intended  for complex capabilities and understandings of
perspective coordination.   Mead believed that perspective taking arises
from interactive engagement with others across different perspectives in
contexts of communal problem solving (Martin, 2005).  For Mead, ethical
practices  and  agentive  activity  involve  a  dynamic  and  reciprocal
interactivity  between  the  “first  person  perspectives”  of  individuals,  the
“second person perspectives” of particular others, and the “third person
perspectives”  existing  within  broader  social  processes  and  structures.
35
Mead argues that  through interaction and cooperation with  other social
objects,  the child develops a  reflective  consciousness,  the ability to
make herself the object of her own attention (Biesta, 1999).  For Mead
(1934), becoming aware of oneself through the perspectives of others is
the foundation of both self-reflection and social competence. Mead (1947)
characterized a path of normal development, in which the child begins,
through imitative play, gradually to take the positions of particular others,
and  then of  the society as a whole (Mead’s  “generalized  other”).   In
particular,  through  symbolic  interactions,  one  is  “constituted  a  self-
conscious member of the community to which he belongs” (Mead, 1934).
Once the self-as-group-member is formed, behaviour is guided by the
expectations of the social group, as reflected in the conscious self. In
other words, if moral expectations are an intrinsic component of one’s self-
concept,  and  if  identity  carries  motivational  power,  then  motivation
becomes an integral part of moral self-consciousness.
Piaget (Piaget, 1932) can be considered the first author who studied the
development of perspective taking ability from an empirical psychological
point of view.   He (Piaget, 1932, 1965; Piaget & Inhelder, 1963) pioneered
the empirical investigation of perspective taking.  His main effort was
to  discover  the  spontaneous  sociomoral  reasoning  about  rules  and
transgression, right and wrong, through the use of the “clinical interview”
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technique.   He used an open-ended clinical method, which entails the
use of dilemmas to engage the child in social or moral thought.
Piaget  established the cognitive-developmental  approach,  theorizing
(1932/1965)  invariant  stages  in  the  overall  cognitive  development  of
children that imply changes in reasoning.  From such a major theoretical
framework, Piaget conceptualized the  moral development of the child
as well as related facets of social development (Lickona, 1974).  He
(Piaget, 1948) looked to the child’s moral development as dependent on
the kinds of relationship in which the child participates (Furth & Youniss,
2000).  He hypothesised a progressive sequence developing from moral
realism  to  relativistic  morality.   Young  children  understand  morality  in
terms of obedience – thinking in concrete and egocentric ways – and the
social  worlds  as  dominated  by  outwardly  “omniscient  and  omnipotent
adults”.   Older  children look to morality in terms of cooperation among
peers,  being  cognitively  capable  of  comprehending the  perspective  of
others and recognising  fundamental notions such as reciprocity because
their  social  world  consist  mainly  in  egalitarian  interactions  with  equals
(Youniss, 1992; Carpendale, 2000).
Piaget referred to  egocentrism as the child’s incapacity to differentiate
between  his  own  perspective  and  the  perspectives  of  others  and
perspectivism  as  an  increasingly  acquired  capacity to  accommodate
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one’s behaviour to other points of view, differentiating and coordinating
among one’s own and others’ points of view.
b.  KOHLBERG  AND  THE  DEVELOPMENTAL-STRUCTURAL
APPROACH.
Selman was also strongly  influenced by  Lawrence Kohlberg (Selman,
2003),  understanding his  research works  as attempting to  comprehend
relationships between perspective taking and moral development (Gordon,
Damon,  Selman,  1974;  Selman,  1971,  1975).    Following  the
methodology approach of Piaget,  he (Kohlberg, 1969) conducted in-
depth interviews and qualitative analyses of responses, concentrating
on the way of  thinking about  situations (Rest,  Edwards,  Thoma 1997).
Kohlberg was interested in the reasoning behind the answer.  In practice,
he  analysed  the  spontaneous  reasoning  of  the  subjects  in  reply  to
hypothetical moral dilemmas.
Kohlberg  moved  in  a  sort  of  parallel  with  Selman’s  definition  of
perspective  taking  having  regard  to  the  way  the  individual
differentiates his perspective from another, and the mode in which he
relates these perspective to one another.   This sort of social reasoning,
also if closely related to moral reasoning, is on the contrary more general
– since it  does  not  deal just  with  fairness and with  choices of  right  or
wrong – insomuch as a judgment of fairness at  a  certain level  is more
difficult than to simply see the world at that level.   In his interpretation of
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Piaget’s theory,  Kohlberg (1969) emphasised perspective taking as
an underlying  mechanism for  social  cognition,  and outlined stage
criteria  for  a  structural-developmental  approach.   He  looked at
perspective  taking  as  a  form  of  social  cognition  intermediate
between logical and moral thought, reporting that his sequence of moral
stages are not the product of maturation or the result of the direct teaching
of  new forms  of  thinking  by  the  socializing  agents  (  such  as  parents,
teachers or peers).  Kohlberg reported that there is a sort of horizontal
sequence of steps in movement from logic to social perception to
moral judgment.  First a person attains a logical stage which allows him
to see system in the world.  Next he attains a level of social perception or
perspective  taking,  where  he  sees  other  people  understanding  one
another in terms of the place of each in the system.  Finally he attains a
particular moral judgment, where the welfare and order of the total social
system or society is the reference point for judging fair or right.  In a few
words,  he  looks  at  morality  as  a  realm pertaining  to  people’s  thinking
about how they ought  to  relate  to each other  and how social  systems
should  be  organized.   Kohlberg,  in  order  to  identify  a  more  general
structural construct  which underlines both role taking and moral judgment,
suggested the concept  of  sociomoral  perspective which refers  to  the
point  of  view  the  individual  takes  in  defining  both  social  fact  and
sociomoral values.
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Kohlberg  (Kohlberg,  1976)  asserted  that  social  experiences  do
promote development by stimulating the person’s mental processes.
As the person interacts with  others,  he finds his views questioned and
tested and being driven to take more comprehensive positions.   Such a
change occurs through  perspective taking opportunities to consider
others’ viewpoints (Kohlberg, 1976).  Interacting with others,  children
learn how perspectives differ and how to coordinate them in cooperative
activities.
The stages emerge from a person’s own thinking about moral problems.
Kohlberg  (Kohlber,  1969;  Lapsley,  2006)  believed that  a  stage
characterization is justified when 4 criteria are in place: (1) at each stage
there  must  be  a  qualitative  difference  in  the  way  children  reason,  (2)
stages must follow each other in an invariant sequence, (3) each stage is
characterized  by  an  underlying  greater  order  of  thought  or  structure
d’ensemble, also known as structured wholeness, (4) each lower stage is
hierarchically  integrated  into  the  following  stage,  Kohlberg  (1969)
proposed a model  of  moral  reasoning development  that  involved  three
levels (each level then held two sub-stages): preconventional (Stage 1 and
2), conventional (Stage 3 and 4), and postconventional (Stage 5 and 6)
(Kail & Cavanaugh, 2004).  One way of understanding the three levels is
to think of them as  three different types of relationship between self
and society’s rules and expectations.
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From this approach,  at  preconventional  level the person looks to the
same roles and social expectations as external to the self.   It contained
the first  two stages and is the most immature level  of  moral  reasoning
because  it  is  characterized  by  an  egocentric  emphasis  and  superficial
reasoning.  In Stage 1 (Heteronomous morality) an individual does what
he or she is told without question and right and wrong is based on whether
it coincides with an authority figure’s commands.  Stage 2 (Individualism,
instrumental purpose) is acting well-behaved in exchange for rewards.
At this concrete individualistic level, the sense of right and wrong is based
on what will  result  in punishment for the individual.   The perspective to
follow his own interest, however, begins to open up to the recognition of a
reality in which the other individuals have their own interests.  The subject
is aware that each person has his own interests, which may be in conflict
and, therefore, what is right is relative, of course, in the concrete individual
sense.
At the second level, the person is conventional in the sense that he has
somehow internalized roles as well as the expectations of others.  This is
due to his focus on meeting social expectations and maintaining order and
contains the middle two stages.  The conventional individual subordinates
the needs of the single individual to the viewpoint and needs of the group
or the shared relationship.  His reason for being concerned is the good of
society as a whole.  Clearly, he is speaking as a member of society.  This
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concern for the good of society arises from his taking the point of view of
us members of society.   So, the mutuality which first developed at stage 3
is expanded at stage 4 to subordinate the dyadic relation to the group
perspective.  Stage 3 (Mutual interpersonal expectation, interpersonal
conformity) is behaving the way others want you to act.   In Stage 3, an
individual’s  sense  of  right  and  wrong  is  based  on  what  will  please  or
anger/hurt others.   At this level, it becomes important to show concern for
others,  in  the  sense  of  developing  mutual  relations,  developing  the
concepts of loyalty, trust,  gratitude and respect.   The person therefore
needs to be a good person both in his own eyes and in those of others,
while manifesting a desire to follow the roles and authority according to a
stereotyped  behaviour.   It  develops,  therefore,  the  perspective  of  the
individual in relation to other individuals.   The person is aware of mutual
expectations, which are considered prior over individual interests, being
able to put himself in the shoes of others, although not yet at the level of
generalized systems perspective.   The societal perspective of stage 3 is
still not yet aware of society’s point of view, or the good of the whole of
society.  The stage 3 member of a group perspective is that of the average
good person, not that of society or institution as a whole.  The stage 3
perspective sees the things from the point of view of a shared relationship
between  two  or  more  individuals  rather  than  from the  viewpoint  of  an
institutional whole.  So the stage 3 reasoning works best in two-person
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relationships with family members or close friends, where one can make a
real effort to get to know the other’s feelings and needs and try to help.
Stage 4 (Social system and conscience) is abiding by the rules in order
to preserve social order.  In Stage 4, a sense of morality is based on the
desire to follow the rules of society to maintain social harmony.   In other
words, right and wrong is what society says because it is for the greater
good.   It then develops a concept of right as something that contributes to
society, to the group, the institutions in general.  In this sense, the point of
view of society  is developed by interpersonal relations or needs.  At this
stage 4, the respondent becomes more broadly concerned with society as
a whole.   From such a perspective, society needs became a centralizing
framework (Gibbs et al., 1983, pp. 140- 141) because the subjects make
moral decisions from the perspective of society as a whole and they think
from a fully-fledged member-of-society perspective (Colby and Kohlberg,
1983, p. 27).  The people functioning at Stage 4 have a conception of the
function of laws for society as a whole.  The importance of this way of
thinking  is  clear with  the  concept  of  common  good  expressed  in  the
present study.  What is important to underline for the purpose of this study
is that at Stage 4, perspective taking is raised from the level of the dyad to
the  level  of  a  general  social  system  involving  a  group  or  a  social
perspective.    The  person  at  this  level  views  the  social  system  as  a
construction  of  conventional  perspectives  which  all  members  share  in
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mutual  relationship  with  his  own;  the  subject  realizes  that  each  self
considers the shared point  of  view of  the generalized other (the social
system)  in  order  to  facilitate  accurate  communication  with  and
understanding  of  others.   At  this  stage,  conceptions  such  as law and
morality are based upon the idea of a consensual group perspective.
Finally, at  postconventional level, the person has differentiated  himself
from the roles and expectations of others, and thus defined his core values
in terms of self-chosen principles.  Stage 5 (Social contract or utility and
individual rights) is following the morals of society when you believe they
are applicable.   In Stage 5, an individual tries to adhere to societal rules
for the greater good, but believes there are exceptions to the rule.   For
example,  he or  she may view the illegal  activity  morally acceptable.  In
other words, there develops the prior-to-society perspective, the reference
(prior to rules) to the welfare of all  individuals.    Stage 6,  finally,  is  an
individual moral viewpoint based on abstract ideology and values (Kail &
Cavanaugh, 2004) that refers to universal ethical principles.  In Stage 6,
an individual creates his or her own view of right and wrong based on
more  abstract  principles.    Combining  various  levels  of  societal  and
personal views of morality, he or she makes individual ethical decisions for
each separate dilemma.   The perspective is that of morality, recognizing
people as an end in itself.
c.  SELMAN  AND  THE  STAGE  MODEL  OF  PERSPECTIVE
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TAKING
Selman (1980) proposed a structural psychosocial model and an interview
method that are equivalent to the moral reasoning development proposed
by Kohlberg and that reflect the ideas of Mead and Piaget.
He  used  social  dilemmas  (Selman,  1976a)  in  order  to  study  the
individual’s  ability  to    reflect  and  report  on  abstract  concepts,  and
therefore capture the mature state of  a developed process and not  its
emergence.   He focused on three main structural aspects of perspective
taking: (1) the standpoint of people regarding the solution to the problem,
(2) how the individual assumes alternating perspectives of the characters
in the issue, and (3) how the person see  such different perspectives in
reciprocal relation.
Selman (  1969,  1980,  2003)  emphasised  the  social  origins  and  social
processes that initiate and maintain the developmental accomplishments
within his model.  He placed the engines of development within the social-
relational activity and interactivity of the child and by which developmental
accomplishments flow from an ongoing immersion and participation in the
practices of families, communities, societies, and cultures.
His goal was to define a developmental sequence in the coordination
of social perspectives.   He viewed it in terms of qualitative changes in
people’s construction of their understanding of the relation between the
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perspectives  of  self  and  other (Selman,  Watts,  &  Schultz,  1997,
Selman, 1980; Selman & Schultz, 1990).
The model suggested that  as children learn to  perceive other  people’s
points of view and integrate them with their own, they are more able to
show deeper understandings about other persons – such as their feelings,
beliefs and motivations – and are then better able to manage relationships
in their lives.   Moving through the stages, the undifferentiated worldview
of  the  child  becomes  connected  and  related  to  particular  others,  thus
enabling the child to move beyond his or her subjective experience, to
more objective reflections on the self, and eventually to the perspectives of
generalized others, representing the views of social groups.   So far, the
Selman theory can be used to explain people’s developing awareness of
societal issues (Selman & Dray, 2003; Dray, Selman, & Schultz, 2009).
Selman’s reflective stages reveal an increasing ability of the individual to
differentiate and abstract positions beyond immediate situations, together
with the psychological orientations that are associated with them.   In this
way,  the  developing  person  cultivates  a  richer,  more  reflective
understanding of the self, the other, and relationships between self and
various others, including the ability to employ and critically analyse third-
person, reflective and conventional, social perspectives.  Selman (1973,
1980)  presented  an  empirically  supported,  logical  sequence  of  five
descriptions of Selman’s five stages of perspective taking (numbered 0-4)
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of social role or perspective taking and coordination  beginning at around
age 4 and  advancing at 2-year intervals to age 15 plus.   Here, we will
briefly describe each of Selman’s levels in ways generally consistent with
his own descriptions of them.
Selman  (1974)  theorized  that  before  stage  0,  the  child’s  development
displays  no  physical differentiation between the self as an individual and
other individuals.
Level  0 is known as  Undifferentiated/Egocentric Perspective Taking
(Age 3 to 6).  At this level, children have difficulty differentiating another’s
point of view from their own.   They do not readily relate perspectives and
tend to  base their  social  judgments on observable  actions,  rather  than
psychological states.   The child’s reflective skills are dominated by  his
own perspective,  especially in interactions that  are less familiar or less
material (Schofield & Kafer, 1985).   This lack of differentiation between
external  acts  and  internal  feelings  can  lead  to  confusion  between
intentional  and  unintentional  behaviour.    The  child’s  own  perspective
predominates  in  a  single  perspective  world.    Furthermore,  the  child
believes  that  others think,  feel,  and act  with  the same intention as the
child.
Level 1 is  Differentiated/Subjective Perspective Taking (Age 6 to 8).
At this level children realize that others are subjects with perspectives of
their own and can differentiate their own perspective from others.   They
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slowly  become  aware  that   physical  differentiation   may  also  be
paralleled by a psychological  differentiation of the perspectives or
different persons.   They  still have difficulty in coordinating discrepant
standpoints.   Children at this level understand the differences between
overt behaviour and covert thoughts or feelings.   However, they still tend
to  use  physical  observation  to  ascertain  internal  states  and they have
difficulty  in  recognizing  that  internal  thoughts  can  be  mixed  or
contradictory.  The  child’s  understanding  of  the  other  occurs  only  in  a
unidirectional  fashion.    The  child  is  unable  to  preserve  his  own
perspective  while  simultaneously  taking  on  the  perspective  of  another
person and vice versa.   Thus, the child tends to focus on one particular
perspective and does not put differing perspectives in a clear relationship
to each other.   One perspective dominates the other, without any attempt
at integration.   In Selman’s terms: The child “understands the subjectivity
of persons, but does not understand that persons consider each other as
subjects” (Selman, 1976a, p.304).
Level 2 is known as  Self-reflective/Reciprocal Perspective (Age 8 to
10).  At this level, the child develops awareness that people’s perspectives
exist  in a reciprocal  relationship to each other.   The child matures the
ability to consider himself from the other’s psychological perspective.  He
is able to reflect on his own actions and underlying motivations from the
perspective of another particular person.   Thus, the child is increasingly
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able to switch between  his  own perspective and the other’s perspective,
permitting more mature, self-reflective thoughts.  However, at stage 2, this
taking  of  the  other  perspective  in  relation  to  one’s  own  subjective
perspective happens sequentially,  not  simultaneously.    This sequential
process prevents the child from stepping outside the relation of these two
perspectives  to  acquire  the  vantage  point  of  a  third  person  observer.
However, at this stage, this second person understanding is limited
to one or another perspective, and does not permit the simultaneous
consideration of two or more different perspectives.
The  two  final  stages  of  Selman’s  developmental  theory  of  perspective
taking  are  level  3  and  level  4.   Level  3 is  Third  Person/Mutual
Perspective Taking (Age 10 to 12).   At this age the person is able to
take on perspectives simultaneously, considering them all at once.   The
early  adolescent’s  understanding  of  the  mutual  self-other  perspective
taking involved in any social situation, enables him to step outside of such
situations  and  adopt  a  third-person  perspective  on  the  interpersonal
exchanges  taking  place.    This  ability  allows  the  child  to  take  on  the
perspective  of  a  generalized  other,  or  a  third  person  representing  a
particular  social  group.    He  can  in  fact  eliminate  himself  from  the
immediate  situation  and  use  an  outside  perspective,  considering  both
other’s  perspective  and   his  own perspective,  allowing him to take the
stance of a less partial, generalized other.   Level 4,  that is the greatest
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stage  of  Selman’s  model,  is  known  as  Societal  and  Conventional
System (Age 12 to 15+).   It consists of In-depth and Societal Symbolic
Perspective-Taking.   It is connected to what I call common good.   In
fact,  the  individual  operating  at  this  Level  examines  social
interactions  beyond  the  level  of  the  immediate  interaction  by
expanding his perspective to the social and conventional system.   At
this level, the perspective taking is raised from the level of the dyad to the
level  of  a  general  social  system  within  which  he  operates,  as  a
construction of  the conventional perspective which all members share in
mutual  relationship  with  his  own.    So  the  subject  realizes  that  self
considers the shared point of view of generalized other (the social system)
in order to facilitate accurate communication with and understanding of
others.   The individual, at this level,  recognizes that though others are
capable of self-reflection, they are not always self aware.  Level 4 role-
taking also considers the broader set of personality traits, beliefs, values,
and  personal  history  when  attempting  to  understand  another  person’s
point  of  view.    At  this  perspective  level,  individuals,  dyadic
relationships,  and  groups  are  seen  as  operating  within  a  larger
societal, legal, and moral system.
In  the  development  of  his  research,  Selman  worked  hard to  apply  his
understanding of perspective taking as “an analytical tool” (Selman, 1980)
to an increasingly broader social  context  (Elfers,  Matin & Sokol,  2008).
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Selman (1974) tried to apply his model to different  social  domains that
included, but went well beyond the understanding of perspective relations
between persons.   Conversely,  his  main studies remained anchored to
specific issues such as friendship, peer relations and parent-child without
embarking on broader societal relationships.
d. BEYOND SELMAN – EXTENDING PERSPECTIVE TAKING
MODEL  INTO  ADULTHOOD  LOOKING  TO  THE  COMMON
GOOD.
Significant contributions to Selman’s perspective taking model have been
made  by  other  researchers  (Martin,  Sokol,  &  Elfers,  2007).    For  the
purpose of the current study it is important to focus on  those efforts that
tried to expand the model beyond the stages proposed by Selman taking
the model into adulthood looking.   Such a look to the mature perspective
is  important  because  it  represents  a  prerequisite  to  applying  the
perspective  taking  model  to  broader  domains  such  as  public  ethical
reasoning.
Diane Byrne (1974) suggested an additionally stage to Selman’s stages.
She hypothesized that young adults, beyond stage four, comprehend that
some conventions are insufficient in relating differing third person
views  to  each  other.    In  particular,  insufficient  conventions  mirror
unrecognized  attachments  to  a  “system  of  analysis”  of  the  individual
(Byrne 1973), which may reflect the personal history and social context of
one or more of the participants.   Acknowledgement of such difficulties
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allows some young adults to  critically distance themselves from their
social contexts and backgrounds so as to achieve a more objective
point of view.  According to Byrne (1973), this allows adults to  take a
more  objective  stand  towards  their   own or  another’s  theoretical
point  of  view, thus moving towards a more rational  and universal
means of ordering and coordinating social relations.
Elfers, Martin, & Sokol (2007, 2008) proposed a review and extension (to
later adulthood) of Selman’s model of perspective taking.   They integrated
the recent  neo-Meadian  and  neo-Piagetian  approach  on  perspective
taking and its role in the development of agency and self-consciousness
(Russell, 1996; Martin, 2005, 2006; Gillespie, 2005, 2006).  These authors
proposed  two  additional  pre-reflective  and  two  supplementary  meta-
reflective  stages.    The  two  pre-reflective  stages  –  categorized
Perceptual/Experiential Repetition and Positional Possibilities – occur
early in life and are grounded in the daily practices of children within their
immediate  social  environment.   It  involves  conventional  and  recurring
exchanges of the young child with care-givers.  The child’s contribution in
these two stages of perspective taking give to the child skills that provide
developmental  support  for  engaging  in  the  following  reflective  stages
proposed by Selman (1973, 1976).   They reproduce some of the reflective
progresses that occur in Selman’s early stages, although at a level of non-
reflective  activity,  rather  than  at  a  level  of  activity  attended by  explicit
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verbalization or reflective thinking.   The final two meta-reflective stages
proposed by Elfers, Martin, & Sokol move Selman’s perspective taking
stages into mature adulthood.   They are named respectively Idealized
and  Dialogical  Perspective Taking.   Both stages contain a significant
extent of advanced reflective thinking.   In such situations, the mature
person experiences the limits of social conventions in their aptitude
to  bridge  disparate  views  that  are  too  oppositional  to  yield  to
coordination  through  existing,  prior  practices  of  negotiation,
compromise,  and  problem  solving.    In  the  Idealized  stage  of
Perspective  Taking,  the  person  involves  with  others, in  ways  that
recognize  and  respect  particular  ideological  commitments  and  social
perspectives, in order to reach communicative ideals that promote broad
level of consensus building and communal problem solving.   In contrast,
the  Dialogical  stage  of  Engagement  With  Others,  is  based  on  the
assumption that  the only  way to  come to  a  common understanding of
profoundly divergent perspectives, is to persist in discovering possibilities
of truth in each of the conflicting perspectives.  They are two approaches
of meta-reflective  perspective  taking involved in social  problem solving.
Consequently,  only  a long and continued commitment  of  those holding
discordant perspectives will produce a wider understanding of constraints.
The  individual  engages  with  others  in  ways  that  do  not  assume  a
universalistic stance towards ideological and societal conflicts, remaining
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instead open to the fallibility of any and all positions, and recognizing the
need to generate novel approaches to address context-specific challenges
and conditions.
e.  BLASI  AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL  SELF  OF  THE  MORAL
ADULT.
These approaches to mature social perspective taking are consistent with
the Blasi approach.   He (Blasi, 2008) underlined that the competencies
and attitudes that would be required by a mature adult to function morally
are: (a) some form of post conventional moral thinking that would allow a
person to take a moral critical stance vis-à-vis his society’s unjust laws
and practices; (b) the ability to control an attitude of lazy acceptance with
regard to his authorities, and to assume, instead, a critical attitude also
toward himself,  questioning his moral perceptions, his motives, and the
justifications  he  gives  for  his  behaviour;  (c)  the  sense  of  personal
obligation  to  act  according  to  the  norms  and  ideals  that  he  has
appropriated  and  made  his  own,  and  the  attitude  of  accountability  to
himself  and to others, this too based on the sense of ownership of his
actions.   In  a  few  words,  Blasi (Blasi,  2001)  emphasized  that  the
capacity  to  appropriate  the  moral  values  of  one’s  culture,  of
responsibly  taking  them  over,  and  investing  one’s  life  in  them
necessarily  implies  the  capacity  to  distance  oneself  from  one’s
society,  the possibility of being critical  of,  and even rejecting,  the
54
values of  one’s culture.  Both require  in the person the sense of an
individual  self,  experienced  as  different  from the  society  to  which  one
belongs  and  to  some  extent  autonomous  with  respect  to  socialization
pressures.   Such an experience of the self as subject is central, meaning
it as “the immediate experience of oneself as separate from other objects,
as  the  source  of  action  and  unified  in  action,  present  to  itself  in  the
process  of  acting”  (Blasi,  2001).    Separateness  gives  origin  to
distance, and distance to the possibility of responsible criticism and
opposition.   Further developments of the subjective self occur through
two processes, dialectically related to each other,  active appropriation
and distancing.  People are able to actively take possession of their own
characteristics and also what is offered to them by the social environment
in ways that  differ both from learning processes and also from what is
frequently  understood  as  internalization.   Blasi  called  “active
appropriation” the  process  leading  to  distinctions  among  different
aspects of ourselves.  Through appropriation one selects the desires and
the characteristics that one wants to have, rejects the others as not really
one’s own, and is thereby motivated to responsibly foster the former and
inhibit  the latter.   Thus,  it  is  by active  appropriation that  one comes to
personally possess oneself.    Active appropriation requires  distancing,
that  is,  a  process  by  which  one  stands  back  from  whatever  can  be
appropriated, objectifies it, creates a space between it and oneself, and
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therefore frees oneself,  to some extent,  from its grasp.   As a result  of
distancing,  a  person  becomes  capable  of  applying  evaluative  criteria,
whatever they may be, to others’ expectations, rules, norms, and social
values.   Therefore one can, at least in principle, also engage in a rational
critique of authority and society.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE COMMON
GOOD:ESTABLISHING A METHOD THROUGH
THE  CONSTRUCTION OF A QUESTIONNAIRE.
INTRODUCTION. 
Calling for a recognition of and commitment to the “common good” have
surfaced in  the wider  debate.   In particular  it  is  possible  to see social
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demand for and “ethic of the common good” (Halstead and Pike, 2006).
The individual has to constantly deal with increasingly complex “public”
situations  (related  to  the  world  of  work,   social,  legal  and  political
institutions) that necessitate a “morally mature” subject to be involved in
difficult  choices (Narvaez,  2010).   In such situations,  awareness of  the
moral implications of one’s adult roles and its primacy relative to individual
interests becomes fundamental.  From such an understanding of common
good and awareness of the moral responsibility of participating in the large
public good  (Narvaez, 2010) there is then derived the sense of citizenship
and  one’s  civic  obligations.   What emerges  is  the  development  of  the
citizen in relation to various coexisting interests of common good: one at
local  community  level,  another  at  national  level  and  yet  another  at
supranational or global level (Bornman, 2003). Such different orientations
are closely linked to the person’s mature understanding of his own place in
the world,  so that  having a  strong sense orientation  leads to  a  strong
citizen interacting positively in his or her community.
The main aim of this first study is to provide the reader with a practical
method for assessing the different orientations to the common good
in social situations. Therefore in the present first study it is described the
background and the rationale for the construction of the Orientation to the
Common Good Questionnaire (OCGQ).
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The  methodological  choices  made  in  the  construction  of  the  analysis
system fully reflect the theoretical reference, widely presented in the first
two introductory chapters.  
In particular, these can be grouped into three basic aspects:
• the use of story dilemmas designed to elicit moral judgment and to
invoke a conflict  between the different orientations to the common
good hypothesised – referring to the Piaget clinical method, in the
version then perfected by Kohlberg with the moral judgment interview
(MJI);
• the attention to the logic for the choice and not the decision –
how  people  interpret  public  ethic  situations  and,  therefore,  how
individuals apply their moral concepts in such realities;
• the use of a mixed-method that links quantitative and qualitative
data  –  matching  a  recognition  measure (to  evaluate  the
importance of the various levels of common good orientation) and a
production  measure (  to  explain  or  justify  their  choice);  such  a
mixed-system allows a triple advantage: 1) requiring the person to
pay  more  attention  to  the  task  being  called  to  explain  his  own
thoughts;  2)  making  it  possible  to  verify  if  the  answer  chosen  is
consistent with the thinking of the subject; 3) making it possible to
keep the study of the spontaneous reasoning of the subject.
63
The task is to create an instrument that will allow the person to express
himself  so  that  what  she/he  says,  such  as  a  particular  attitude  to  a
common good, can be interpreted as clearly as possible.  According to this
perspective, therefore, the understanding of the individual,  his logic, his
basic  criteria,  are  discovered  by  the  reasons  the  person  gives  for  his
opinions, judgments, decisions, and then by his reasoning.  
The main methodological value of this study shall be represented by the
same method used for the construction of the coding system for the
spontaneous  reasoning  of  the  subject.   Looking  at  the  process
proposed by Loevinger (1970), it  affords the continuous revision  and
development of the theory on which the measure depends and vice versa.
The aim is to combine theoretical principles and empirical evidence in
the construction process of the coding system.  The principal idea is
that theory and measurement cannot be separate from each other,  but
must form an integral unity and must constantly feed on each other (Blasi,
1993).   It is used a “built-in feedback loop, going from protocol scores to
the categories and from categories back to protocol scores” (Blasi, 1993)
(Figure 2).   
Figure 2.
64
Unlike Kohlberg who in structuring his coding system for the MIJ uses
substantially theoretical principles, it is followed the Loevinger approach
that chose to start from the identification of stages and categories defined
in general terms, leaving it  to people – through empirical evidence – to
define the different categories. Following such a methodological approach,
the construction of the measure presented in this work begins  with the
conception of  common good orientations (a),  then the decision of
placing response categories at specific levels has to be justified by
both empirical and conceptual considerations (b), finally in revising the
description of an orientation or in carving out a new level,  an important
requirement  was  that  the  cluster  of  its  characteristic  makes
psychological  sense  or  suggests  a  degree  of  psychological
coherence (c).  The  research  method  used  start  off  by  imagining  the
demands that people and observers may raise for themselves in dilemmas
involving common good.   In doing so, the reference is to the different
kinds of orientation to the common good hypothesized and to how people
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develop a reflective process in addressing these issues – from complete
indifference to the common good, to an effort to limit one’s responsibility
for  the  common good to  a  full  involvement  in  the  broad  moral  issues
connected to the common good – felt intimately as his own.  It is not make
“a priori” but “a posteriori” decision about the different types of response
that people could provide to our scenarios.  The aim is not to impose a
specific moral views in such situations but to refer to the subject’s point of
view,  looking  at  how  people  can  arrive  responsibly  using  their  own
personal  judgements. It  is  provide  then  to  assemble  the  different
responses together  according to  semantic  criteria,  trying to  understand
their meaning in the light of the initial theoretical assumptions.
Essentially,  the  phases  followed  are  the  following:   (a)  selection  and
implementation  of  concrete  dilemmatic  situations  and  response
alternatives clearly attributable to each orientation to  the common
good;  (b)  development  of  the  coding  manual for  the  responses
autonomously provided by the subjects,  (c) identification of a  definitive
form  of  the  instrument  with  a  useful  coding,  rating  and  scoring
system;  (d)  percent  agreement  and  inter-rater  correlation  between
two coders for a sample of 150 subjects aged between 14 and 21 years
of age. Each of these tight consequential phases is presented taking care
to explain the logical process used, summarizing the preliminary studies
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conducted to arrive at the final version of the instrument and the system of
analysis (Figure 3).
Figure 3.
a.  DILEMMAS  AND  ALTERNATIVE  OF  RESPONSE
SELECTION.
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1.  THE  IDENTIFICATION  OF  CONCRETE  SITUATIONS  AND
PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE COMMON GOOD. 
The original idea was to present the participants with dilemmas regarding
the common good structured in order to elicit reasoning response in public
situations.   
The followed strategy is to refer to many instances, events, or situations,
which seem to have the potential to raise moral interrogations for morally
attentive adults. The intent is to produce issues that replicate a sense of the
moral ordinariness, complexity and urgency that occurs in our world. The
moral dilemmas in fact play an essential role in the collection of valid moral
judgment data (Gibbs, 1992). They make at least two contributions to moral
judgement assessment: 1) they provide concrete situational details that can
lead into and facilitate the process of abstract  common good reflections
(subjects seem to “warm up” to reasoning about moral values connected to
the common good as they attend to the relevant details of the dilemma); 2)
they promote the likelihood that  one can elicit  from the subject  a  moral
“reflection without interference from preconceptions” (Walker, 1990) – the
moral dilemmas “set  the mind working”  (Brown & Herrnstein,  1975) in a
fresh  and  spontaneous  way,  rendering  more  likely  the  production  of
scorable reasoning, that is, patterns of thinking that are generic rather than
idiosyncratic.  
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The dilemmas are designed similarly  to  Kohlbergian dilemmas (Colby &
Kohlberg, 1987), except that each story involves situations of public ethics
related to:
• legal obligation -  legal obligations – connected, for example, to
issues of corruption or bribery (such as encouraging a person in a
public  competition  not  to  follow  the  waiting  lists  ),   or  to
circumstances  that  involve  not  following  the  law  because  it  is
judged too costly or disadvantageous (as, for example, building on
land improperly), or to evading the taxes owed to the State for the
person’s  own  business,  etc.   Consider  the  following  example:
“Daniela lives in a small  rented apartment with her husband and
three children.  Daniela owns nearby land  in an environmentally
protected area where it  is  not  possible  to  build.   The area is  a
tourist  attraction  and  is  located  right  next  to  a  river.    On  the
surrounding  land,  despite  the  restrictions,  many  owners  are
building,  counting  on  the  possibility  of  a  subsequent  amnesty.
Daniela is considering whether to build herself a house”;
• not strictly normed obligations but to general rules of ethics –
the reference is,     therefore, to scenarios  relating to the protection
of strictly “common” “goods”: material common goods (such as the
environment, the beauty of the landscapes, water, peace) or more
abstract common good such as justice, truth, etc.   Consider the
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following  example:  “Joan,  along  with  her  husband  and  two
daughters, owns a media company that produces parts for home
appliances.   She is now considering the possibility of moving the
bulk of her production from her country to other countries, as a lot
of competing companies have already done so,  reducing costs.
The cost of labour is in fact significantly lower”.
The hypothetical moral dilemmas were constructed in order to represent
an internal value conflict between the four different orientations to
the common good hypothesized and generally described in the first
chapter – personal, group, national and global.   The situations refer to
really relevant matters for the subjects, fictitious but plausible situations,
which  are  very  likely  to  exist  in  real  life.    Each  dilemma focuses  on
different issues that were chosen in order to represent the central value
conflict  between personal,  group,  national  and global  orientation to  the
common good and to elicit different levels of reasonable response by the
subjects.   For example, in the previous “Daniela dilemma” (related to the
decision to build a house illegally), the conflict is between the value of a)
preserving  the  needs  of  her  own  family  (giving  them a  home),  b)  or,
antithetically, the safety of other known residents (who would be put at risk
by building in a dangerous area), c) upholding law established for equity
and justice in all the nation, d) and, finally conserving nature as a whole.
Any specific, more or less “reflected” reason assignable to one of the four
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specific  orientations  of  the  common  good  can  be  then  understood  at
different levels by the subject.   So, always following the above example,
the person  can choose  in  this  conflict  the global  interest  just  because
“nature comes first” or because “to safeguard nature is our reciprocal right
and duty because we all belong to humanity and nature is essential for the
life of each of us”.  Both answers are based on the same assumption or
moral common good, but only in the second case does there seems to be
an argument that justifies the choice.  The dilemmas are intended as a
device  for  activating different  orientations  to  the common good (to  the
extent that a person has developed them) and for assessing them in terms
of  judged  importance.    Thirty  situations  were  identified,  coming  from
different fields of expertise, substantially related to the world of work or to
the widening spaces of communities – the phenomenon of migration, the
widespread poverty, the social cost of public corruption, the issues related
to  wars, the protection of nature or the question of pollution, and so on.
Particular  attention  was  paid  to  making  the  scenarios  as  varied  as
possible, referring to different types of circumstances: a) some concern a
person (the protagonist of the story), faced with a choice between different
possible  actions;  b)  others  concern  a  situation,  for  which  a  number  of
people  in  a  group (e.g.  a  committee)  decide what  direction to take;  c)
others where the subject is presented with an individual who has made
choices, and should  review these choices.
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2.  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  RESPONSE  ALTERNATIVE  ANSWERS
CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH ORIENTATIONS.  
The instrument, as mentioned in the preliminary chapter, has dilemmas
and standard items of response, in order to link quantitative and qualitative
data,  matching  recognition  and  production  measure.   The  response
alternatives were built: 1) starting from a list – initially abstract and general
– of all the possible reasons attributable to the four types of orientation
identified;  2)  providing  then  to  follow  up  each  scenario  with different
response  alternatives,  each  directly  related  to  one  of  the  4  different
interests  assumed.   The  arguments  proposed  were  built  so  that  each
response: is as short as possible (only one sentence, not too complex)
and  not  too  technically  worded,  represents clearly  each  of  the  four
orientations to the common good as close as possible excluding the other
(each choice being in contrast with all the others), does not sound ironical
or in any way deprecating,  matches the different orientation underlining
the contrast between the different choices.  Specifically, each response to
the situation  represented  in  the  scenario  was  designed  to  include  two
elements: (a) what for the protagonist of the scenario is right  to do, he
thinks he should do, judges to be the right decision, etc.. b) the reason for
his  decision  or  his  thinking.   Consistent  with  the  theoretical  and
methodological reference, in the articulation of responses the focus was
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not put on choice but rather on the reasons, with only the first considered
to  show  a  functional justification  due  to  one  of  the  four  hypothesised
interests.
3.  SCENARIOS  AND  ALTERNATIVES  OF  RESPONSE  DEFINITION
THROUGH TWO QUALITATIVE PRELIMINARY STUDIES. 
Starting from the initial thirty scenarios, with four response options each
connected to one of the assumed orientations to the common good, two
independent preliminary studies were carried out aimed at reaching a final
version of both dilemmas and responses.  The aim was questioning the
answers given by the subjects (from the point of view of the orientation to
common  good  hypothesized)  providing  to:  analyse  the  concrete  and
semantics  understanding  of  the  scenario  as  well  as  of  the  different
alternatives  of  choice  (1),  check  if  the  scenario  truly  produced  an
understanding linked to the conflict of different interests vis-à-vis common
good (2); verify and questioning the distribution of the frequency response
of  the  different  orientation  to  the  common  good.  The  two  preliminary
studies  allowed  for  a  definition  of  the  stimulus  for  the  analysis  of  the
orientation to the common good – consisting of 15 scenarios each with
three  response  alternatives,  the  instructions  for  the  compilation  of  the
same, as well as the overall system of analysis for the responses given by
subjects.
a) FIRST PRELIMINARY STUDY.
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Participants.  180 subjects, all  students at a military school;  the group
consisted of  103 men and 77 women, aged between 19 and 23 years
(mean age = 21.60, D.D. = 5.64). It was then divided into three different
groups of 60 people each, randomly assigned.  
Measures  and  Procedure.   To  each  group  was  administered  an
equivalent  form  –  balanced  according  to  the  different  characteristics
differentiating the scenarios – made up of 10 scenarios with four choices.
The participants completed the measures in a quiet setting with no time
constraints.  Most participants took about twenty minutes to complete the
materials.  Each answer given by each person was a full transcript, for a
total of 600 responses analysed.  Two independent researchers provided
then to conduct a qualitative analysis of responses.  
Results  and  Outcomes.   Analysing  the  responses  provided  by  the
subjects revealed that some of the situations proposed were too complex
or not  so relevant for the subject,  highlighting responses that  were not
completely  centred and not  reasoned by the subject.    We decided to
exclude  these  scenarios  and  also  the  dilemmas  that  did  not  produce
significant  individual  differences (eliminating  those  with  one of  the four
alternatives > 60% of responses).  Besides, in most of the scenarios one
of the alternatives  received a very low percentage of  choice (< 5-8%),
pointing  out  how  in  most  of  the  scenarios  the  presence  of  all  four
alternatives of the common good was forced and not due to a real conflict
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between  orientations.  Starting  from such  evidence  it  was  modified  the
rationale behind some aspect of the choices making them more consistent
with the ones freely produced by the subject and it was decided to opt for
each situation for the presentation of three choices instead of four, in order
to make the conflict most significant.
b)  SECOND PRELIMINARY STUDY.  
Participants.  60 subjects from three classes in the third and fourth year at
high school: the group consisted of 23 men and 37 women, aged between
15 and 18 years (mean age = 16.02, D.S. = 8.42).  
Measures and Procedure.   A version of the instrument (derived from the
findings  in  the  first  study)  was  given  consisting  of  23  scenarios  with  3
options, each related to one of the 4 orientations to the common good.  The
participants, divided into the three classes, completed the measures in a
quiet setting with no time constraints.   Most participants took about forty
minutes to complete the materials.   Each answer given by each person
was  a  full  transcript,  for  a  total  of  900  responses  analysed.  Two
independent researchers then provided to conduct a qualitative analysis of
responses  (with  the  same  procedure  for  the  first  study)  and  to  the
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implementation of a focus-group (audio recorded and fully transcribed) with
12 subjects centred on general impressions about the questionnaire.  
Results and Outcomes. Through the analysis of the responses provided
by  the  subjects,  it  emerged  that  in  some  scenarios  there  was  a
predominance of one response alternative over the other (< 60%), so as to
make it necessary to eliminate them or at least to proceed to an additional
skimming of  the  scenarios.   Furthermore,  the analysis  of  the responses
highlighted a not always complete correspondence between the alternative
of choice selected and the response provided independently by the subject-
sometimes attributable  to  a  different  orientation  from that  marked in  the
questionnaire.   Such evidence highlighted the need to refer (in the scoring
system) to the orientation re-evaluated by an encoder after the reading of
the answer given by each subject.    At  least,  the implementation of  the
focus-group allowed the definition of some details of the scenarios and the
answer choice – in order to make them more “credible” – and to refine the
instructions of the questionnaire – in order to make the task clearer.
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b. THE CODING MANUAL DESIGN.
The questionnaire required the subject to explain, for each dilemma, the
reason  for  the  choice  selected.    The  faced  question  was  that  every
response, in principle if not actually, was different from every other.   The
strategy used was first to refer to the different levels of orientation to the
common  good  and,  then,  to  the  qualitative  differences  in  the
understanding of the same category.   Every response was then matched
against the sequence of different levels of orientation to the common good
and to the succession of qualitative stages within the same orientation.   At
this  point  every  response  was  assigned  to  the  level  it  most  closely
matched  (first  the  level  of  orientation  –  personal,  group,  national  and
global – second the level of understanding within every orientation).  For
every single response, the aim was to make the best estimate we could
from whatever information was encoded within it.
It was proceeded mainly following the method proposed by Loevinger
and  Wessler (1970) for  the  analysis  and  construction  of  the  coding
manual of ego development, trying to adapt it to the needs of our study.  In
particular, as already reported in the preceding chapter one letter d, the
basic idea of this method consisted in not deciding a priori categories to be
used  for  the  encoding  of  data,  but  rather  to  define  a  posteriori,  by
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analysing the answers given by the subjects.  It was roughly followed the
diverse phases that characterise this approach.
1.  CODING  MANUAL  IMPLEMENTATION  THROUGH  TWO
QUALITATIVE PRELIMINARY STUDIES. 
Moving  from  the  general  and  abstract  category  initially  used  for  the
construction of all  the possible reasons attributable to the four types of
orientation,  it  was  performed two  preliminary  studies  aimed  at the
construction of  an interlocutory  exemplar  and categorized  manual.  The
two studies refer  to  the mentioned “built-in  feedback loop”,  providing –
through going from protocol scores to the categories and from categories
back to protocol scores” – to  anchor the coding system to the effectively
response carried out by persons.
a) THIRD PRELIMINARY STUDY.
PARTICIPANTS.  120 subjects – sixty young adult students from a military
school between 18 to 23 years of age, and sixty students in the third and
fourth year of high school between the ages of 15 and 18 years.   The
group consisted of 71 men and 49 women.  
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MEASURES AND PROCEDURE.   The 1800 responses analysed were
obtained from the responses given by the subjects in the two previous
studies already reported in the different form of the final 15 dilemmas.   
RESULTS AND OUTCOMES.  The procedure substantially allowed the: 1)
independent  collection  from each  scenario  of  a  series  of  examples  of
significant response, the collection  of  all examples with common contents
and  that  could  be  traced to  the  same  code  –  exemplar  manual;  2)
identification  of  each  set  of  responses  through  a  statement  that
encapsulated the essence, the common element – categorized manual.
Therefore  this  study  allowed  the  recognition  of  categories  directly
connected with those expressed by the subjects without reconnecting the
same to underlying reasons or, otherwise, not clearly expressed motives.
b)   FOURTH PRELIMINARY STUDY.  
PARTICIPANTS.  100 subject random identified from a total sample of
224 young adults students at a military school between 18 to 23 years of
age (mean age = 20.43, D.S. = 13.42).  The group consisted of 126 men
and 98 women.  
MEASURES AND PROCEDURE.   The final version of the instrument was
given consisting of 15 scenarios with 3 options, each relating to one of the
4  orientations  to  the  common  good.   The  participants  completed  the
measures in a quiet setting with no time constraints.  Most participants
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took about 30-35 minutes to complete the materials.  The data set was a
random  breakdown  in  two  tranches  (A  and  B)  of  100  subjects  each,
working only on the first tranche (A).   Each answer given by each person
was a full transcript, for a total of 1500 responses analysed.  Using the first
draft  of  the  manual  coding  (outcome  of  the  previous  study),  two
independent  coders proceeded to  score all  the answers  of  the first  50
subjects and then of the second 50 subjects.  
RESULTS AND OUTCOMES.   Through the analysis of the responses
provided  by  the  two  independent  coders  to  the  first  50  subjects,  we
provided a qualitative comparison of the response coded through the final
version of the categorized manual, remodelling the coding system in order
to be more responsive to the answers developed by subjects.   Using the
revised  version  of  the  manual,  further  coders  categorization  of  the  50
remaining subjects  was  used  in  order  to  assess  degree  of  agreement
between the raters.   The per cent agreement was of 85% in relation to the
orientation category (between the category) and of 75% for the specific
category (within the category).  Further analysis of the discrepancies found
between coders was used in order to improve a second version of  the
categorized manual.
2. THE ENDING RATIONALIZED FORM OF THE CODING MANUAL. 
Finally, it  was analysed the categories identified starting from preliminary
studies from a theoretical point of view.   Through the attempt to rationalize
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all empirical differences among categories in terms of theory, I got to a final
version of the coding manual.   The aim was to create a rationalized form,
related to a hierarchical order within the different categories, due to a more
or less “reflected” mode of understanding and orientation.   Having regard to
the theoretical  approaches described in chapter one and two, it  was re-
categorised the groups of response looking at the reflective process below
each one, and to the underlying investment in the moral issues.   In this
sense, for each of the four orientations of the common good hypothesized
(A- personal; B – group; C – national; D-global), are traced responses at
different levels (1 to 4) of understanding.  Only for reasons of practicality
have all categories been identified with this system of recognition (letter for
the orientation and number for level of understanding).  Clearly not all the
categories could be traced back to a clear order of development and, rather,
in some cases, the same sets of responses had to be considered as simple
qualitative categories, without a clear theoretical coherence.   In “Appendix
A” are  presented  all  the  categories  together  with  the  rationale  and
examples explaining each category.
Specifically,  moving  from  the  extended  list  of  all  categories,  can  be
identified the following main clusters of theoretically relevant responses:
• basic and automatic responses that demonstrate a lack of reflection
respect to the choice made.   Such responses, while being indicative of
a certain orientation to the common good, do not indicate a person’s
81
developed  ability  to  justify  their  assumption  of  common good and  to
express their reasoning.   These type of responses are placed at level 1
of each orientation of the common good.   Specifically, this  automatic
response of common good – placed at  group level  (B1),  national
level (C1) and global level (D1) – are almost entirely based on what is
proposed in the response alternative or in the scenario, with no personal
reflection  or  investment  in  the  situation (using  the  same  words)  or
referring to expressions such “this is right” or “I think exactly in this way”;
• intermediate  responses that,  while  making  explicit  reference  to  the
predominance  of  one  orientation  over  another,  are  based  on
assumptions  and  specific  aspects  that  are  the  outcome  of  having
assimilated some aspects, rules or values without having fully reflected
and  deeply  made  it  their  own.    In  this  sense,  the  person  reports
internalized  issues  of  common good  (clearly  attributable  to  a  certain
orientation) without a reflected selfhood.  These type of responses are
placed  at  Level  2.     In  particular:  specific  and aspecific  national
orientation  (C2) that  express  the  good  of  the  nation  as  prevalent
compared to other orientations without a full understanding of the social
structure of reference and a full  moral commitment (“the good of  the
nation  comes  first”  or  “must  always  place  the  needs  of  their  own
country”). This interest can be divided into sub-categories that refer to
particular aspects – such as economy, competitiveness, innovation and
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growth of the nation (“we must always protect the state's economy” or
“the development of companies improves the competitiveness of their
country”); security of the nation; ethical climate in the nation; etc. – that
are  interiorized  but  not  completely  selfhood; specific  and  specific
global orientation (D2) that refer to values or universal goods (nature,
environment, water, peace, equity, justice), chosen as more important
than others (due to the orientation or national group or staff) but without
explaining the reason.    The global reach of such goods is given by the
context  of  the  scenario  or  the  option  chosen  without  an  active
interiorization and a reflective  comprehension (“you must  respect  the
earth”, “the water must be of all“ or “peace must come first”);
• responses that  refer to a  full  understanding of the common good.
These groups of responses, in fact, show an ample capacity by people
in justifying their choices, showing that they are able to question their
assumption and to actively internalize them.  The common good, then, in
addition to being actually internalized are also fully felt and understood.
These categories  demonstrate the ability to embezzle the related moral
value and to feel fully responsible for this.   These type of responses are
placed at level 3.  Specifically: full national orientation (C3) that refers
on the one hand to the society understood as a network of relationships
defined  by  fairness  and  justice  (putting  the  emphasis  on  abstract
institutions and interactions that structure the society itself), on the other
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hand to individual attitudes to the society that affect (1) respect for the
law and the rules governing the institutions, including the meritocracy;
(2) the duties and responsibilities in specific roles (doctors, journalists ,
etc.) for the common good; (3) the sense of responsibility, sense of civic
duty, for the good of the country; full global orientation (D3)  refers on
the one  hand to  relations  between nations  made of  respect,  justice,
equity (which included the development of specific themes such as not
having other countries,  helping the poorest countries;  perfect equality
among nations; fundamental rights of each country, the good of all is
more important than the interest of a single country), and on the other to
an  understanding  of  a  global  humanity,  with  common  rights  and
reciprocal  duties  (through  specific  topics  such  as  the  fundamental
equality of persons, beyond differences in language, customs,  culture,
and  the ideal  of  reciprocity;  ratio  of  solidarity  with  people  from other
countries and culture).
In  the  cluster  of  responses  presented  above  there  are  no  categories
related  to  personal  and  group  orientation.   In  the  first  case  (using  an
“orientation”  logic,  different  from  that  of  “understanding”  used  for  the
construction of all other clusters) it was proceeded to the construction of a
single  group  comprising  all  fully  personal  categories  (A1;  A2;  A3)  that
therefore have “self  interest” as the common element to be focused on
rather than “common” – that, as for all other categories refers to a broad
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social  structure.   In  the  second  case,  instead,  it  was  excluded  the
categories of response related to group orientation (B2, B3, B4) because
these classes of response were not connected by an empirical point of
view to the other constructs hypothesized as relevant from a theoretical
point of view.
c. THE FINAL FORM OF THE INSTRUMENT WITH A USABLE
RATING AND SCORING SYSTEM.
The questionnaire was developed for administration to adolescents as well
as adults (ages 14 – 21+ years).  It takes approximately 30-35 minutes to
complete.    There  are  fifteen  stories.   Under  each  story,  there  are  3
choices listed as to what the character  in  the story  should do and the
reasons why the character should behave as specified.   Each of the three
choices is  attributable  to  one of  the 4  hypothesised orientations to  the
common good.  After reading each story, subjects are asked to respond
indicating which of the three choice alternatives they prefer, referring not
so much to what the character in the story should do (or what he would do
in  the character’s  situation)  but,  rather,  to reasons associated with  the
choice.  A second task required is to explain the reasons for the choice.
The full questionnaire is shown in “Appendix B”.
As already explained in the preceding paragraphs, the fifteen stories were
chosen and modified through two studies that  enabled the selection of
those best suited to the purpose of this PhD work.   The three reasons
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listed  under  each  story  were  based  on  previous  typical  or  common
responses to the stories which correspond to a specific orientation to the
common  good  category.    These  reasons  were  chosen  to  be
representative of the types of reasoning responses given by subjects aged
14-21 (based on the previous studies reported in the paragraph c).
The potential conflicts between the four orientations to the common good
presented in the dilemmas are attributable to three conflicts: personal vs
group vs national,  personal  vs  national  vs global,  group vs national  vs
global.    These  contrasts  are  related  to  six  fundamental  conflicts:  1)
personal vs group; 2) personal vs national; 3) personal vs global; 4) group
vs national; 5) global vs group; 6) national vs global.
1. THE CODING SYSTEM. 
The  procedure  for  rating  single  responses,  chosen  and  then  freely
produced by the subjects, was derived from theoretical assumptions and
the evidence of preliminary studies, always following the method proposed
by Loevinger and Wessler (1970).  The rating process was based on some
basic rules:  1)  rate every response.   There are four essential  general
possibilities  in  matching  a  response  to  the  scoring  manual  (general
scoring): the response may fit one category and be completely relevant
for  the  common  good  (R-relevant);  it  may  be  meaningful  but  fit  no
particular  category being not  due to  an issue of  the common good (I-
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irrelevant).   In this case reference can be made to three different types:
(a)  the  explanation  does  not  apply  to  any  of  the  four  orientations
hypothesised  but  is  based  on  different  aspects  such  as  altruism  or
personal morality;  (b) does not explain the choice made, but why other
options were not chosen; (c) prevents or eliminates the conflict between
the orientations; it may be omitted or too fragmentary to be meaningful (M
– missing); it may be meaningful to the common good but fit no particular
category (U – unclassifiable).   2)  rate the response as a whole. The
unit of measurement is the issue concerning the common good (which is
indicated in the responses) rather than word choice or count.  The idea is
that nothing less than the whole response is a safe index of the subject’s
meaning. 3) rate on the level of meaning.  In particular, what the subject
meant to say, without making any inferences about what the subject really
means but trying to take the meaning of the completion at its face value; 4)
rate  through  a  careful  judgment.   The  classification  (while  being
independent  from the  scenario)  must  proceed dilemma by  dilemma,  in
order to allow the encoder the specificities of each scenario.
The task is to decide whether the response at issue shares whatever the
common content of the category is.   Aware that the different categories
are arbitrary,  the categories serve no purpose except to aid raters in
finding first the orientation to the common good the response refers
to  and,  then,  the  connected  level  of  reasoning  within  the  same
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orientation.  To do that the raters  have to: 1) establish the orientation the
response  refers  to,  in  any  case  the  option  chosen  by  the  subject;  2)
assess  whether  the  explanation  is  sufficiently  detached  from  the
formulations suggested in the situations and options, in order eventually to
encode the response as a minimal expression (see manual); 3) make sure
that there is a category that reflects closely the explanation provided by
the  subject;  4)  compare  the  category  identified  with  others  with  which
there  might  be  confusion  in  deciding  which  is  most  appropriate  (see
manual); 5) finally encode the answer.  One should not, however, force the
a response into a category where its fit is dubious, but rather proceed to
“unclassifiable” response.
2. THE SCORING SYSTEM. 
Entering into the scoring procedure, for reasons of conciseness and clarity
the focus has been placed first on the orientation score and then to the
reasoned score. Indeed the two scores are not separated from a conceptual
point of view.
• THE “ORIENTATION” SCORE.   The first scoring procedures for the
responses  refer  to  the  orientation  chosen  in  contrast  with  the
other.   The  computation  is  made  taking  into  account  the
orientation re-evaluated by the rater.   It is possible to compute a
“single  orientation  score” –  one  for  each  of  the  four  types  of
orientation  to  the  common  good  hypothesized  –  or  an  “overall
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orientation  score”  –  a  single  total  score  indicative  of  the  general
orientation specific for each subject.   In each story, for all the three
reasoning categories submitted as response (and referable to one of
the four basic orientations), value 1 is assigned if it is chosen and 0 if it
is not chosen.  The subject’s ratings are then compared to the answer
key  (which  provides  the  orientation  to  the  common  good  category
corresponding to each of the three reasons for each story) then the
“assigned  value”  is  listed  under  the  respective  orientation  and  the
scores  are  added  up  for  each  category.    This  is  the  “SINGLE
ORIENTATION SCORE”, one for each of the four orientations to the
common good hypothesized – personal score, group score, national
score, global score.  In some cases, it is desirable to obtain an overall
score rather than separate scores.   There are two overall scores:  a)
the “FREQUENCY OVERALL ORIENTATION SCORE”, computed by
considering the frequency of each orientation and  establishing the
membership of each subject to one of three characteristic modes
of  response  considered  relevant  to  an  understanding  of  and
orientation to the common good: strong predominance of personal
(with at least 60% of responses to self-interest); high percentage of
national and global responses (the sum of which is at least equal to
65%  of  total);  finally,  an  intermediate  group,  where  no  interest  is
predominant;  b) the  “COMPUTED  OVERALL  ORIENTATION
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SCORE”, calculated by subtracting the individual category score from
those related to larger structures – the group category score, national
category score and global category score.
• THE  REASONED  SCORE.   The  scoring  of  the  responses  freely
produced by the subjects are computed by followed these steps: 1)
making  sure  that  at  least  10  dilemmas  have  yielded  scorable
response:   Questionnaire that fewer than 10 scorable response do
not result  in  reliable protocol scores, and should be discarded from
analysis;  2) similarly  to  what  is  reported  above  with  regard  to  the
orientation  score,  in  each  story   value  1  is  assigned  to  the  single
category  rated  and  then  the  “assigned  value”  is  listed  under  the
respective category and the scores are added up for each category.
As  reported  in  the  previous  paragraph,  the  single  reasoned
categories are identified by a letter indicating  reference orientation (A
–  personal,  B –  group C –  national,  D –  global)  and by a  number
indicating the different levels of understanding each category (1 to 4).
The  response  provided  by  the  subject  may  combine  parts
corresponding to two or more categories.  In this case ( if the rated
category is qualitatively different) value 1 is assigned to each single
category rated, so that every story can generate more than one score;
3) being  the  scores  of  the  single  categories  too  fragmented,  the
“REASONED SCORE” is  calculated  referring to  the  sum of  those
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categories fixed at similar levels of reasoning and understanding, with
a  clear   reference  to  an  order  of  development  connected  to  the
common  good.   There  are  four  broad  categories:  “not  qualified
response of common good” (B1 + C1 + D1).  “totally self-interest
response” (A1+A2  +A3),  “internalized  but  not  up-reasoned
response” (C2 + D2) and finally  “full understanding response of
common  good”  (C3  +  D3);  4) to  compute  the  “OVERALL
REASONED SCORE”,  I  consider  the  frequency  of  each  reasoned
category and establish the membership of each subject to one of three
characteristic modes of response relevant to an understanding of and
orientation to the common good: strong comprehension of common
good (subjects  with  high  C3  +  D3  and  low  A1+A2+A3);  low
comprehension of common good  (subjects with low C3 + D3 and
high  A1+A2+A3);  finally,  an  intermediate  group,  where  there  is  no
type of comprehension predominant.
d. THE EVALUATION OF THE SCORING MANUAL: THE PER-
CENT  AGREEMENT  AND  THE  INTERRATER  REABILITY
ANALYSIS.
An essential part of any research project using a production measure is
the  attainment of satisfactory inter-rater reliability.   In order to carry out
an analysis  of  the  final  version of  the coding manual,  it  was  collected
approximately 300 protocols relating to students at three high schools in
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Rome.  It was proceeded then to the preparation of a detailed analysis
system of 150 protocols by two independent coders.  Through the study of
the agreement between the evaluators  and a survey of  the inter-raters
reliability, it was possible to obtain the identification of a single reference
distribution of the score.  The starting point was the final rationalized form
of the scoring manual.  For same sample of protocols, a list of responses,
identified only by code number, was typed for each stem.  The responses
were thereby removed from the context of their protocols.  Thus the rater
had to get information solely from each response considered on its own.
There was no possibility  of  reading a response differently according to
other responses given by the same subject or according to background
knowledge concerning the subject, all of which is omitted.  For each stem,
every  response  in  the  sample  was  given  a  category  recognition  score
(referring to the level of reasoning connected) by two raters, each working
alone.   The raters rated all  responses to one dilemma before going to
another dilemma.  After completing the ratings for one dilemma, the raters
conferred  where  they  differed  and  arrived  at  an  agreed  rating  and
recognitions/production category for each response.   Each rater rated all
protocols  before comparing  with  others.   The final  step  was  decoding.
Here  every  response  was  listed  in  the  category  the  raters  had  put  it,
together with the protocol number.  The decoding reports then formed the
basis for the empirical revision of the manual.
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1. PARTICIPANTS. 
Were collected approximately 300 protocols from as many students at 
three high schools in Rome, on the whole balanced by sex; 150 subjects 
were included in the study selected by random mode, of which 71 males 
(47.3%) and 79 females ( 52.7%).  The age was between 14 and 21 years,
with an average of 17.11 years and a standard deviation of 1.538.
2. CODERS TRAINING SYSTEM. 
The study involved two evaluators: the first one  “expert” – because he
had actively contributed to the setting of the theoretical study and to all
subsequent stages of the methodological  construction of the instrument
and  to  the  preparation  of  the  manual  coding;  the  second  one  “non-
expert” –  without  expertise  with  the  theory  of  reference  used  for  the
setting of the questionnaire, as well as with the instrument and with the
coding system used.  In this sense, I set up a system of ad hoc training,
divided as follows: a)  first phase of familiarization with tool and with
the manual of codes; it consisted in a familiarization with the instrument
and with  the manual  coding by the not  expert  coder,  also through the
study of coding examples in the manual and the subsequent discussion of
the  same  with  the  expert  evaluator;  b)  second  phase  of  practice
evaluation: through coding 30 protocols drawn from the 100 previously
used for the  structuring of  the final  version of  the coding manual  and,
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therefore, already encoded by the two expert evaluators; the non-expert
coder  proceeded  to  coding  in  a  totally  independent  manner  (thereby
avoiding any contact with the other expert evaluators)  in “blind” mode (i.e.
they  do  not  have  any  news  relating  to  the  subject  and  analyse  each
response far removed from the general context of the individual protocol),
proceeding to the scoring of responses to one scenario at a time; at the
end, evaluations of all responses for each scenario were compared with
those of the experts, including through further discussion with the expert
evaluator  in  order  to  harmonize  any  discrepancies;  c)  training  that
involved  both coders: from the 300  protocols  available,  30  protocols
were  randomly  selected  and  coded  (in  “blind”  with  respect  to  the
characteristics  of  the  subjects  and  the  other  answers  provided  by  the
same person) independently (between the two evaluators):  At the end of
the coding phase steps were then made to compare the encodings carried
out, before proceeding to further discussion and harmonization of coding
modes  in discordant cases.
3. SCORING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED. 
For the protocol scoring procedure included in the study, it was followed
the subsequent steps: 
a)  Data  base  planning:   The  subjects  were  identified  with  a  new
reference number, proceeding to create a database, divided by scenario,
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each consisting of 150 responses (for a total of 2250 responses).  The
material was organized to allow a “blind” assessment by the two coders,
based solely  on the answer  given,  without  knowing any feature of  the
subject and of the other answers in the same protocol.  
b) Response codification:  The two coders proceeded to the coding of all
responses  of  all  subjects  for  all  scenarios  independently,  avoiding any
contact at this stage.   Specifically, the following steps were followed:  1)
verifying that all subjects had an encoding for all the answers, both at the
level of orientation for each scenario that coding operated directly by the
encoder;   2)  counting,  for  each  subject,  the  number  of  responses
considered relevant for orientation to the common good, in order to identify
those protocols identified as reliable based on the number of evaluable
responses (at least 10) and excluding those not used by reason of the
excessive number of missing answers; 3) calculating, for each subject, the
individual scores and totals, referring both to the orientation (considered
individually and in conflict) and to the qualitative categories (arising from
coding made by each assessor).  
c)  Comparison  of  scores:  checking  the  percentage  of  agreement
between the two coders and inter-rater  reliability.    Inter-rater reliability
was assessed using Cohen’s kappa statistics (Dunn, 2004; Kraemer et al.,
2002).  High kappa values indicate the ability of the investigated measure
or classification to make clear distinctions between subjects (Kraemer et
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al.,  Vach,  2005).   In  addition,  it  might  reflect  the  ability  of  raters  to
distinguish between adjacent categories (Darroch and McCloud, 1986).
4. RESULTS.
a) ORIENTATION RATING OF EVERY RESPONSE. 
The orientation response chosen by each subject for the 15 dilemmas
was  re-evaluated  by the  two  raters.   The  aim,  as  amply  explained
before,  was  to  confirm  the  concordance  of  the  orientation  chosen
(marking one of the three responses on the paper) with the quality of
the response actively produced by the subject (rated as attributable as
personal, group, national or global orientation).  Also in this case the
results highlighted a high agreement between the two raters (95%) as
well  as  high Cohen’s kappa inter-rater correlations (k = .93 ,  p < .
0001).    A  substantial  agreement  between  the  two  raters  was
evidenced. (Table 1).
Table 1.
SINGLE ORIENTATION SCORE (personal, group, national and global orientation)
N INTERRATER CORRELATION* PERCENT AGREEMENT
2250 .93 95,3%
* correlation is significant (p < .0001)
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b) RATING OF SINGLE REASONED RESPONSE.
It  was  measured  the  relationship  between  the  coding  of  the  two
evaluators for each response actively produced by all the subjects for
all the 15 dilemmas.  The reference being the single coding manual
categories identified by a letter indicating the reference orientation (A –
personal,  B  –  group  C  –  national,  D  –  global)  and  by  a  number
indicating the different level of understanding each category (1 to 4).
The  results  underlined  a  good  agreement  between  the  two  raters
(93%) and  high Cohen’s kappa inter-rater correlations ( k = .91 , p < .
0001).  A substantial agreement between the two raters was evidenced
(Table 2).
Table 2.
SINGLE REASONED SCORE (A1,A2,A3,A4; B1,B2,B3,B4; C1,C2,C3,C4; D1,D2,D3,D4)
N INTERRATER CORRELATION* PERCENT AGREEMENT
2250 .91 92.6%
* correlation is significant (p < .0001)
c)   RATING OVERALL SCORE. 
In order to verify the agreement between the two coders relative to subject
and not to the single response, it  was analysed also the overall  score,
referable both to orientation and reasoned measure.  Also in this case the
outcomes are largely satisfactory.  As underlined in the following tables,
for the overall score relative to orientation the agreement between the
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two raters was absolute (100%) as well as the Cohen’s kappa inter-rater
correlations (k = .1  , p < .0001).  A substantial agreement between the
two raters was evidenced.  Also with respect to the overall reasoned score
the inter-rater correlation was high (k = .98 , p < .01). (Table 3).
Table 3.
OVERALL ORIENTATION SCORE – FREQUENCY (strong predominance of personal;
high percentage of national and global responses; no interest predominance)
N INTERRATER CORRELATION* PERCENT AGREEMENT
150 .1 100,0%
* correlation is significant (p < .0001)
OVERALL REASONED SCORE (strong, low and not predonminat type common good
comprehension)
N INTERRATER CORRELATION*
150 .98
* correlation is significant (p < .01)
e. DISCUSSION
The  present  study  was  structured  to  render  comprehensible  all  the
methodological  steps  made  in  the  construction  of  the  instrument  of
analysis of the orientation to the common good.  The intention was to
clarify,  starting  from the  theoretical  assumptions  presented  in  the  two
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introductory  chapters,  the  phases  used  both  for  the  creation  of
dilemma stimulus and coding system for the spontaneous reasoning
of the subjects.
The  constant  attention  paid  to  combine  theoretical  principles  and
empirical evidence has been highlighted also through the presentation
of four preliminary studies.  Those pilot investigations – characterised
by the continuous “going from protocol scores to the categories and from
the  categories  back  to  protocol  scores”  (Blasi,  1993)  –  point  out  the
strong anchorage of the questionnaire to the spontaneous mode of
the subjects to interact with respect to ordinary situations of public
ethics. The  study  shows  all  the  methodological  choices  made  –  with
respect to  questionnaire structure (number and composition of dilemmas
and response alternative, response mode request to the subject),  rating
and scoring procedure and, especially, to the category of coding adopted
for the response actively produced by the subjects – are the outcome of
such a continuous comparison between theory and empirical findings.   As
evidenced,  even  if  not  all  the  manual  categories  refer  to  a  theoretical
relevant order of development, some of these were found to be consistent
with the initial assumptions, highlighting the presence of different modes of
reasoning with respect to the common good.
All the methodological choices made are shown to be supported by
more than encouraging reliability.  The questionnaire displays in fact
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high  inter-rater  reliability  between  two  raters,  with  one  of  the  two
inexperienced (respect to the theory and the analysis system).  Inter-rater
reliability  was  elevated  both  in  relation  to  the  coding  of  the  type  of
orientation expressed in the response (orientation score) and relatively to
the quality of the response produced by the subject (reasoned score).  It
shows  the  efficiency  of  the  coders  training  system  used,  proving  the
questionnaire to be a practical  measure that can be scored reasonably
quickly and reliably even by self-trained inexperienced scorers.
According to this view,  the results of the study necessarily represent
only a first interlocutory and preliminary outcome that will be later
developed through further investigations.  Scenarios as well as coding
categories can be developed which are more responsive to the reasoning
of the subjects.  In order to achieve a more and more comprehensive and
general analysis system it will be useful to focus on how other categories
of persons use to interface with such issues of public ethics.
In this sense, the main value of the presented study is the method that it
affords in the continuous revision and development of the theory on which
the measure depends and vice versa, creating a sort of virtuous circle.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE COMMON
GOOD: 
THE STUDY OF THE RELATIONS WITH 
SOCIOMORAL REASONING AND OTHER 
DEMOGRAPHIC THEORETICALLY 
RELEVANT VARIABLES.  
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INTRODUCTION.
The  objective  of  this  research  is  to  investigate  the  validity  of  the
Orientation  to  the  Common Good  Questionnaire.   It  was  explored  the
extent to which different levels of  socio-moral reasoning are connected
with the level of orientation to the common good (personal, group, national
and global) and to the different levels of understanding that characterise
each orientation (“not qualified response”, “totally self-interest response”,
“internalized  but  not  up-reasoned  response”  and  “full  understanding
response of common good”).  This investigation is intended as a test of
concurrent  validity,  meaning  the  socio-moral  reasoning  as  the  main
reference construct for the measurement.  It was furthermore investigated
the  convergent  validity  with  respect  to  demographic  theoretically
relevant  variables  as  gender  and  socio-economic  status.  It  was
decided to address such analysis in relation to adolescent subjects.  As
many researchers have in indeed noted, adolescence is a period of time
when  multiple  transitions  occur  (Simmons,  Burgeson,  &  Reef,  1988;
Steinberg & Morris 2001).  In particular it implies the transition into large
social  context  experiences, where  the  adolescent  begin  to  assert
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greater autonomous control over his decisions, emotions and actions.  As
a consequence, the understanding of the self in relation to the social world
increases  (Coleman  and  Hendry,  1990)  and  moral  life  faces  new
challenges,  opportunities,  and  influences.    Those  aspects  are  of
fundamental importance for the development of individual differentiation in
the orientation to the common good.
SOCIAL  PERSPECTIVE-TAKING  AND  MORAL  JUDGMENT  AS
CONCURRENT COSTRUCTS OF THE ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON
GOOD. 
Social  perspective-taking  represents  a  central  concept  in  relation  to  the
comprehension  and  orientation  to  the  common  good  in  public  ethic
situations.   The  expression  of  a  certain  orientation  in  social  issues  is
hypothesized to  be  connected  with  an ability  to  take  the perspective  of
different social groups as an extension  of the person’s location, and hence
his or her adoption of a different position through such ability. (see chapters
one and two).   It  is  possible  to make a sort  of  developmental  parallel
between  the  perspective  taking  level,  moral  judgment  stages  and
expression  of  orientation  to  the  common  good.   The  progressive
development  from  self-centred  to  more  in-depth  or  reflective  social
perspective-taking established in Selman’s levels is directly related to the
developmental  structure  of  stages  described  in  the  Gibbs  et  al.  (1992)
revised  version of  Kohlberg’s  moral  judgment  theory.   Such socio-moral
perspective is essential for the purpose of this study because it refers to the
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individual point of view taken in defining both social fact and socio-moral
values. 
Of particular theoretical relevance for the present study is:
a) the transition away from the self-reflective, reciprocal exchange
perspectives of perspective-taking (Level 2) and moral judgment
(Stage  2).    In  both  perspective-taking  and  moral  judgment,  this
transition  marks  a  fundamental  shift  away from an  egocentric  bias
(Moir, 1974).  The persistence into adolescence of a strong “me-
centredness” (Lickona,  1983)  or  egocentric  bias  represents  a
socio-moral  delay  and  it  was  hypothesized  to  be  related  to
personal orientation to the common good and to a low reasoned
level  of  orientation to  the common good.   In  fact  –  while  normally
egocentric bias declines with experience, as subjects see their self-
interest in the light of the welfare of others and the social groups to
which they belong – of course, people continue to have some bias.
Even as mature adults “we experience our own points of view more or
less directly, whereas we must always attain the other person’s view
in  more  indirect  ways”  (Flavell,  Miller  &  Miler,  1993).   As  Piaget
recognized,  adults  come to  view the world  less egocentrically  than
children,  although  they  do  not  outgrow  their  childhood  tendencies
altogether.   Many  social  judgments,  even  among  adults,  are  still
egocentrically  biased.    Such a lack of  decentration (Flavell,  1985)
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naturally lead to certain common good outcomes, connected to the
non-emergence of equality and reciprocity in  social realms (Damon,
1997);
b) the evolution from Stage 3 reasoning – that works best in dyadic
relationships with family members or close friends – to that in Stage 4
– where the subject becomes more largely concerned with society as
a whole.  In this shift the individual emphasizes a strong regard for
societal relations (Berk, 2003) addressing his attention on respecting
authority, obeying laws and performing his duties in order to maintain
the  social  order.   It  requires  extended  perspective-taking
experiences within more complex societal groups, as suggested
by Kohlberg (1984) and demonstrated by Mason & Gibbs (1993).  It
was hypotethized that such a transformation could be related to a
higher  and more  reasoned level  of  orientation to  the  common
good.
c) the increase in  post-conventional  moral thinking likely  to  take a
moral  critical  of  one’s  society’s  perspective  and  to  achieve  a
more objective point of view about social issues (Blasi,  2010).  It
was hypothesized that  those reflecting on the values and norms of
their social structure are discriminant of the capacity to reach a high
orientation to the common good.  Only through an active appropriation
and the distancing from the values and rules of such a society, can the
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person become really involved in such more elevated common good
issues
In this context, the analysis of the correlation between the expression
of  the  socio-moral  stages and  common good (both  orientation  and
reasoned level of understanding)  assume an essential significance in
giving theoretical strength to the central assumptions of my doctoral
dissertation.  The quality of the socio-moral reasoning has to be directly
related  to  the  orientation  of  common  good  expressed  in  public  ethic
situations.
THE  THEORETICALLY  RELEVANT  DEMOGRAPHIC  VARIABLES  TO
THE COMMON GOOD. 
A number of variables have been theorized and evidenced as predictors of
moral reasoning (Turner et al., 2002).  Such variables include: gender, age,
socio-economic  status  and  others  not  mentioned  here.    Testing  the
relationship between orientation to the common good and the demographic
variables are central as a study of convergent validity.
GENDER. The issue of sex differences in moral development and social
perspective-taking has been studied extensively, but with arguable and less
conclusive results (Bryant, 1985; Rothenberg, 1970).  Numerous studies
find  sex  differences  to  be  insignificant  as  a  determinant  of  moral
development (Murray,  1996;  Hunter,  1997;  Kanny,  1997;  Likewise  and
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Coder,  1975;  Dortzbach,  1975;  Lee  and  Snarey,  1988;  Wilson,  1995).
Jaffee & Hyde 2000) conducted a meta-analysis of results from a variety of
moral reasoning instruments.  They reported no significant differences in
either care or justice orientations in moral reasoning between males and
females.   Also  studies  examining  age  groups  from  childhood  through
adulthood have consistently found that females are not scored lower than
males  on  tests  of  moral  judgment  maturity  (Walker,  1984)  but  in  these
studies  women consistently score significantly higher than men  and
there is no bias in favour of men, as Gilligan suggests.  Other research
has found a difference attributed to gender, in favour of girls among
preadolescent and adolescent youth (Shooner-Reichi & Beaudoin, 1998;
Bosacki & Astington, 1999) suggesting that  gender differences in social
perspective-taking  may  emerge  with  the  onset  of  adolescence.
Thoma’s (1986) meta-analysis of fifty-six DIT studies administered to over
six  thousand  male  and  female  subjects  reports  that  at  every  age  and
education level, females score significantly higher than males.  More recent
examples include Morris’s (1977) study of 345 school psychologists, found
females scored significantly higher on a measure of ethical beliefs. Wark
and Krebs (1996) found that males report more stage 2 justice orientation
than  females,  while  females  report  more  stage  3  care  orientation  than
males do.  Also Garmon, Basinger,  Gregg, and Gibbs (1996) found that
early adolescent females were usually at Stage 3 moral judgment, while the
108
males were still evidencing a substantial degree of Stage 2 thinking and that
care-related and ethically ideal expressions were more prevalent in females’
moral judgment.  By mid- to late-adolescence, however, the males “caught
up”, i.e.,  closed the disparity in moral judgment maturity.  This finding is
consistent with several other studies examining gender differences in level
of moral judgment (e.g., Turiel, 1976; Skoe & Gooden, 1993; SIlberman &
Snarey, 1993).  Such gender differences are hypothesized to be central
also for  the orientation and the reasoned level  of understanding of
common good expressed.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC  STATUS.  Numerous  studies  demonstrate  a  link
between  higher  socio-economic  status  (SES)  and  higher-stage
reasoning (e.g.,  Kohlberg,  1963;  Bhargava,  1986;  Devos,  1983;
Commons et  al.  2000).   Bandopadhyaya   (1981)  and Vandana (1993)
established  that  this  relationship  could  be  attributable  to  specific
components of SES, such as income or education.   Anyhow the evidence
suggests that higher socioeconomic status is associated with greater
civic involvement in adolescence (Johnson et al. 1988; Youniss et al.
1997,  1999;  Youniss  &  Yates  1999).   Socio-economic  factors  have
been found to affect moral values and moral processes of evaluating
situations and taking behavioural decisions.  (Sachdeva et al., 2012).
For instance, the economic background of individuals helps to define the
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worth that is attributable to values or rules.  The process is particularly
evident for rules conceivable as socio-conventional.   Evaluations of what
is moral seem to vary according to the differences in the social position
of  individuals,  even  those  belonging  to  the  same  cultural  context  or
country:  for  instance,  the  Indian  social  system  of  castes  that  are
characterised by different  standards in the conceptualization of  what  is
morally  right  or  wrong  (Sachdeva  et  al.  2012).   Substantially,  the
hypothesis is that SES could play an important rule in the expression
of  common  good  orientation  in  large  social  situations,  being
connected both to different possibilities of social interaction (more or
less extensive) and to different levels of individual positioning in the
same social structure experimented.
AIM AND HYPOTHESES.
As discussed earlier,  even though there are no previous studies,  it  was
theoretically assumed a relationship between people’s orientation to
the  common  good  in  situations  involving  public  ethics,  moral
judgment development and related relevant demographic variables in
adolescent subjects. The transition from pragmatic (stage 2) to mutualistic
moral judgment (stage 3) and, then, to societal oriented moral stage 4 and
post  conventional  reasoning  during  adolescence  may be  a  key  process
accounting  for  the  development  of  orientation  to  the  common  good.
Preliminary analyses should find  different orientations to the common
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good  hypothesized  and  the  related  different  reasoned  level  to
correlate  also with  gender  and  socio-economic  status.  It  was  also
analyzed the differences between chronological ages.  The assumption is
that the sample is too homogeneous in terms of age to find a significant
correlation. The main hypotheses of the study are the following:
1. different orientations to the common good (single oreintations scores -
personal,  group,  national  and  global)  will  correlate  with  moral  judgment
stages  (global  stege  and  SRMS)  differently:  negative  correlation  with
personal  orientation  (egocentric  bias) and,  contrarily,  progressively
positive correlations for the other three common good orientations,
realted to the increasingly wider social structures;
2.  the  different  levels  of  reasoning  that  characterize  each  orientation  –
reasoned score: “not qualified response of common good” (B1 + C1 + D1),
“totally  self-interest  response”  (A1  +  A2 +  A3),  “internalized  but  not  up-
reasoned response” (C2 + D2) and finally “full understanding response of
common  good”  (C3  +  D3)  –  will  correlate  with  moral  judgment  stages
(global  stege  and  SRMS):  negative  correlations  with  the  most
elementary categories as “not qualified response” (B1 + C1 + D1) and
“totally  self-interest  response” (A1  +  A2  +  A3) ,  and  progressively
positive correlations to the evoluted categories as “internalized but
not  up-reasoned  response”  (C2  +  D2) and  “full  understanding
response of common good” (C3 + D3);
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3. females (relative to adolescent males) will evidence higher correlations
to up levels of single orientation score and up resoned score;
4. low socio-economicus status subjects will show lower correlations
to high single orientation score  (personal,  group, national and global)
and high resoned score. 
a. METHOD
1. PARTICIPANTS. 
Partecipants included 150  students  from  three  high  schools  in  Rome,
balanced by sex (71 males – 47.3% and 79 females – 52.7%) and ranged in
age from 14 to 21 years, with an average of 17.11 years and a standard
deviation of 1.538. The socioeconmic status (SES) ratings of the familiesd
ranged from 8 to 18 , with means of 13,37 (SD = 3,1). 
2. MESAURE. 
a) ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD QUESTIONNAIRE.  As
previously  discussed,  the  Orientation  to  the  Common  Good
Questionnaire  (OCGQ)  is  a   measuring  used  to  determine
participant’s  orientation  to  the  common  good  (personal,  group,
national and global) and the reasoned quality of response actively
produced by the subject (“not qualified response”, “totally self-interest
response”,  “internalized  but  not  up-reasoned  response”  and  “full
understanding response of common good”). It contains fifteen moral
112
dilemmas,  each  of  which  is  followed  by  three  statements.  The
participants choose one of the statement and then active explain the
reasons for their choice. The scores from the OCGQ – outcome of
the encoding performed by an encoder – were calculated refferring to
single  orientation  score (personal,  group,  national  and  global
score) and overall orientation score (frequency and compute) and
to  reasoned score –  that  fere  to:  (B1 + C1 + D1) “not  qualified
response  of  common  good”,  (A1  +  A2  +  A3)  “totally  self-interest
response”,  (C2 + D2) “internalized but  not  up-reasoned response”
and  finally  (C3  +  D3)  “full  understanding  response”  –and  overall
reasoned score – that fere to: strong comprehension (subjects with
high C3+D3 and low A1+A2+A3); low comprehension (subjects with
low  C3+D3  and  high  A1+A2+A3);  finally,  an  intermediate  group,
where there is no type of comprehension predominant).
b) SOCIOMORAL REFLECTION.   To assess the participants’ level of
moral judgment, it was used the Socio-moral Reflection Measure-
Short Form, developed by Gibbs (1992).   The SRM-SF is a group
administrable, pencil-and-paper production task designed to assess
the  stage  of  moral  judgment.   The  SRM-SF  is  derived  from
Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJ; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
The SRM-SF consists of 11 items that address several socio-moral
values, such as saving a life, not stealing, and keeping a promise.
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Each item contains a two-part question, and respondents are asked
to evaluate and justify the importance of each value.  The justifying
responses are then scored for stage of moral reasoning.  Stages 1
and 2 constitute the immature level of sociomoral reflection and are
both  relatively  concrete  or  superficial,  confusing  morality  with
physical power (Stage 1) or pragmatic deals (Stage 2). Stage 3 and
4 are more mature level of sociomoral reflection in which reasoner
enters  through  superficial  or  extrinsic  considerations  to  infer  the
bases of interpersonal relationship (Stage 3) or society (Stage 4).
The primary SRM-SF protocol  score is the Socio-moral  Reflection
Maturity Score (SRMS), which is simply the mean of the item ratings.
Scores  on  the  SRMS  range  from  1.00  (a  questionnaire  yielding
exclusively  Stage  1  ratings)  to  4.00  (a  questionnaire  yielding
exclusively Stage 4 ratings).  The SRM-SF does not extend beyond
the  fourth  stage.   The  SRM-SF  has  been demonstrated  to  have
acceptable levels of test-retest reliability and internal consistency for
4th through 12th graders, university students, adults, and a delinquent
male  sample  (Gibbs  et  al.,  1992).   In  addition,  the  SRM-SF
evidenced  acceptable  concurrent  validity  with  the  MJI  and
convergent validity with  the theoretically relevant  variables of  age,
verbal  intelligence,  and  SES.   Also,  the  SRM-SF  evidenced
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discriminant  validity  by  showing  no  correlation  with  a  measure  of
social desirability.
c) DEMOGRAPHIC  INFORMATION.  A  questionnaire  designed  to
collect information regarding gender, age, family background (i.e.,
family  composition  and  education)  was  administered  to  each
participant.  Age of participants was given in years and subsequently
reduced  to  three  age  classes.   The  construction  of  the  socio-
economic indicator was based on two aspects: employment status
and level of education of parents.   In this sense, the subjects defined
the  profession  of  their  parents  by  choosing  from  12  different
categories of use, then aggregated into 6 groups.  The qualification
possessed  by  both  parents  was  carried  out  with  reference  to  4
ordered categories (elementary, middle school, high school diploma,
bachelor’s degree).  Through the sum of the four ordinal categorical
variables (employment of the father and mother, educational level of
the father  and  mother)  was  defined  the socio-economic  status  of
each subject.
3. PROCEDURES.
Participants were recruited from three high schools in Rome. The subjects
divided  into  classrooms,  completed  the  measures  in  a  quiet  setting.
During  the  session  participants  were  first  asked  to  read  and  sign  an
informed consent form.   The signed consent forms were then collected
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and  placed  together  in  a  separate  packet  to  keep  the  experimental
material anonymous.  The participants were then given a questionnaire
packet and asked to read it carefully and fill it out completely, but not to
put  their  name.   Participants  were  told  to  take  as  much time as  they
needed to fill out the packet.  Once completed, participants turned in their
packets  to  the  researcher  who  put  the  experimental  material  into  an
envelope separate from the consent forms.
CODING SRM-SF PROTOCOLS.  In the current study,  two independent
raters coded all SRM-SF using a “blind” assessment.  Before starting the
encoding, the raters completed the self-training exercises contained in the
coding manual and checked the score reliability (using protocols from the
sample  not  included  in  the  research  program)  scoring  about  ten
questionnaires  independently,  identifying  and  discussing  scoring
discrepancies.   The  inter-rater  reliability  was  then  computed.   The
agreement  between  the  two  raters  respected  the  minimal  standard
established  by  the  author  to  consider  the  results  valid.    The  SRMS
correlation was r = .788, the global stage agreement with 1 interval  was
95.9% and the exact  global  stage  agreement  was 82.9.   All  of  the 150
students produced scorable protocols.  The SRM scores ranged from 129 to
361 (M = 293; SD = 0.40).  This means that the level of moral reasoning
varied from Stage 1 (only 1 Subject) to Stage 3 (4) (26 students). 
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b. RESULTS
The  results  are  reported  in  two  sections.   In  the  first  one,  concurrent
validity is examined by correlations between orientation to the common
good  and  moral  judgment  measures.   In  the  second  section,  the
association with sex, age and socio-economic status is assessed.  It was
used Sperman correlations and the chi-square test.
1. MORAL JUDGMENT AND ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD. 
In the sample, the correlations between the OCGQ orientation score with
the  SRM-SF are  presented  in  Table  4. As  shown,  “single  orientation
score” relative to personal, national and global orientation correlate
with SRM-SF.  Personal orientation is negative related to SRM-SF (r =
-0,20,  p < .05).  National  orientation and global orentation correlated
positively with SRM-SF (respectively: r =  0,21, p < .01 and r = 0,25, p < .
01).  No correlation was  found  between  the  SRM-SF and  the  “group
orientation score”.  The  “compute overall recognition score” show a
positive correlation to SRM-SF (r = 0,28, p < .01).
Table 4
ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD SOCIOMORAL REFLECTION 
SINGLE ORIENTATION SCORE GLOBAL STAGE SRMS
PERSONAL -,197* -,204*
GROUP -0,119 -0,101
NATIONAL ,219** ,212**
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GLOBAL ,225** ,248**
COMPUTE OVERALL ORIENTATION SCORE ,270** ,285**
*p  < 0.05; **p <0.01
A chi-square  test  was applied to  determine whether  SRM_SF and  the
“frequency overall orientation score” were associated. Results showed
that there is significant association. The personal category tends to be
more present (2.3) in lower stage (stage 2.5).  Beside the national and 
global category tend to be less present (-2.4) in lower stages (stage 2.5). 
Table 5.
FREQUENCY OVERALL ORIENTATION
SCORE
GLOBAL STAGE
1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 Total
DIFFUSED
Count 1 2 3 17 40 9 72
expected count 0,5 1 2,9 12,5 42,7 12,5 72
Stand. residuals 0,8 1,1 0,1 1,3 -0,4 -1
GLOBAL/NATIONAL
Count 0 0 2 3 43 16 64
expected count 0,4 0,9 2,6 11,1 38 11,1 64
Stand. residuals -0,7 -0,9 -0,4 -2,4 0,8 1,5
PERSONAL
Count 0 0 1 6 6 1 14
expected count 0,1 0,2 0,6 2,4 8,3 2,4 14
Stand. residuals -0,3 -0,4 0,6 2,3 -0,8 -0,9
Totale
Count 1 2 6 26 89 26 150
expected count 1 2 6 26 89 26 150
χ2 (10) = 21.9, p < .01. The standard residuals 
greater than 2 are highlighted in bold.
The Spearman correlations between the reasoned score with the SRM-SF
are presented in the following Table 6 and Table 7. As can be seen “not
qualified  response  of  common  good”  (B1+  C1+D1) is  found  to  be
negatively realted to SRM-SF (r = -0,20, p < .05), as well as “totally self-
interest  response”  (A1+  A2+A3)  (r  =  -0,25,  p  <  .01).  Conversely,
“internalized  but  not  up-reasoned  response”  (C2+D2)  and  “full
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understanding  response  of  common  good”  (C3+D3)  are  positively
realted to SRM-SF with a different grade (respectively: r = 0,24, p < .01
and r = 0,36, p < .01).
Table 6.
Table 7.
ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON
GOOD SOCIOMORAL REFLECTION 
 GLOBAL STAGE SRMS
B1_C1_D1 -0,157 -,206*
A1_A2_A3 -,238** -,244**
C2_D2 ,233** ,241**
C3_D3 ,334** ,363**
*p  < 0.05; **p <0.01
A  chi-square  test  was  applied  to  determine  whether  SRM_SF  and  the
“overall reasoned score” were associated. Results presented in Table 8
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REASONED
SCORE SOCIOMORAL REFLECTION 
 GLOBAL STAGE SRMS
A1 -,357** -,348**
A2 0,154 0,122
A3 -0,035 -0,019
A4 0,043 0,02
B1 -0,096 -,169*
B2 -0,152 -0,131
B3 -0,028 0,012
B4 -0,053 -0,043
B5 0,028 0,018
C1 -,194* -,201*
C2 ,175* ,169*
C3 ,254** ,258**
C4 0 -0,014
D1 0,042 0,022
D2 0,123 ,164*
D3 ,228** ,255**
D4 0,117 0,062
E1 0,058 0,014
E2 0,033 0,096
NUL -0,076 -0,093
*p  < 0.05; **p <0.01
showed that there is significant association.  The  low comprehension
subjects tend to be more present (2.4) in low stages of development
(stage  2.5)  and  less  present  (-1.9)  in  high  stages (stage  3.5).
Furthermore, the high comprehension subject tends to be more present
(2.3) in higher stages (stage 3.5) and less present (-2.2) in lower stage
(stage 2.5).   The subjects without a predominant type of comprehension
show no significant trend.
Table 8.
SOCIOMORAL
REFLECTION
OVERALL REASONED SCORE
GLOBAL STAGE Low comprehension
Diffused
comprehension
High
compre
hension
Total
1,0 Count 0 1 0 1
expected count ,1 ,7 ,2 1,0
Stand. residuals -,4 ,4 -,4
1,5 Count 1 1 0 2
expected count ,3 1,4 ,4 2,0
Stand. residuals 1,4 -,3 -,6
2,0 Count 2 4 0 6
expected count ,8 4,1 1,1 6,0
Stand. residuals 1,3 ,0 -1,1
2,5 Count 8 18 0 26
expected count 3,5 17,7 4,9 26,0
Stand. residuals 2,4 ,1 -2,2
3,0 Count 9 62 18 89
expected count 11,9 60,5 16,6 89,0
Stand. residuals -,8 ,2 ,3
3,5 Count 0 16 10 26
expected count 3,5 17,7 4,9 26,0
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Stand. residuals -1,9 -,4 2,3
Count 20 102 28 150
expected count 20,0 102,0 28,0 150,0
χ2 (10) = 26.6, p < .003. 
The standard residuals greater than 2 
are highlighted in bold.
2.  THE  ASSOCIATION  BETWEEN  ORIENTATION  TO  THE  COMMON
GOOD AND  THEORETICALLY  RELEVANT  DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLES.  
In order to investigate the validity of the questionnaire, chi-square crosstabs
were  run to  examine sex,  age and socio-economic status differences in
orientation to the common good. 
a) AGE. 
A  chi-square  test  was  applied  to  determine  whether  age  and  both
“orientation”  and  “reasoned”  scores  relative  to  were  associated.  Results
showed that there is no significant association. 
b) GENDER. 
A  chi-square  test  was applied to  determine  whether  gender and “single
orientation  score”  were  associated.  Results  showed  that there is  an
association between global orientation score and gender (χ2 (2) = 13.4, p
< .001) (Table 9). The examination of the standardized residuals shows that
there  is  a  higher  representation  of  females  (1.6)  and  a  lower
representation  of  males  (-1.7)  in  global  high  score and,  contrary,  a
higher  representation  of  males  (2.0)  and  a  lower  representation  of
females  (-1.9)  in  global  low  score.  Even  if  the  association  between
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national orientation score and gender is significant (χ2 (2) = 5.9, p < .05)
(Table  10),  the  examination  of  the  standardized  residuals  dosent  show
relavant differentiations.  In any case,  it is possibile to underline an higher
representation of males (1.4) and a lower representation of females (-
1.3) in national high score.  There is no association between  personal
orientation score and gender (χ2 (2) = 3.6, p < .165) (Table 11), however
is useful to report as the males tend to be more represented in personal
high  score  while  the  females  are  less  represented.  For  the  group
orientation there is no association.
Table 9.
GLOBAL ORIENTATION SCORE GENDER
Female Male Totale
Global low
Count 14 30 44
expected count 23,2 20,8 44
Stand. residuals -1,9 2
Global mid
Count 29 25 54
expected count 28,4 25,6 54
Stand. residuals 0,1 -0,1
Global high
Count 36 16 52
expected count 27,4 24,6 52
Stand. residuals 1,6 -1,7
Totale
Count 79 71 150
expected count 79 71 150
χ2 (2) = 13.4, p < .001. The standard residuals greater than 1.7 are highlighted in bold.
Table 10.
NATIONAL ORIENTATION SCORE GENDER
Female male Totale
National low
Count 36 30 66
expected count 34,8 31,2 66
Stand. residuals 0,2 -0,2
National mid
Count 28 16 44
expected count 23,2 20,8 44
Stand. residuals 1 -1,1
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National high
Count 15 25 40
expected count 21,1 18,9 40
Stand. residuals -1,3 1,4
Totale Count 79 71 150
expected count 79 71 150
χ2 (2) = 5.9, p < .05
Table 11.
PERSONAL ORIENTATION SCORE GENDER
Female male Totale
Personal low
Count 33 26 59
expected count 31,1 27,9 59
Stand. residuals 0,3 -0,4
Personal mid
Count 30 21 51
expected count 26,9 24,1 51
Stand. residuals 0,6 -0,6
Personal high
Count 16 24 40
expected count 21,1 18,9 40
Stand. residuals -1,1 1,2
Totale
Count 79 71 150
expected count 79 71 150
χ2 (2) = 3.6, p < .165
A chi-square test was applied to determine whether gender and “frequency
overall orientation score”  were associated. Results showed that there is
no significant association (χ2 (2) = 4.95, p < .084) (Table 12), even if there
is  a  consistent  trend,  showing  that  females  are  more present  in
global/natioal group and less in the personal group, while the males
present  the opposite  distribution.  Looking at  the association  between
gender and the most frequent orientation category (χ2 (4) = 16.20, p < .
003) (Table 13) the effect is more evident in particular whith respect to 
global orientation – more females (1.8)  and less males (-1.9).
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Table 12.
GENDER FREQUENCY OVERALL  ORIENTATION SCORE
  DIFFUSED GLOBAL/NATIONAL PERSONAL Totale
FEMALE
Count 34 40 5 79
expected count 37,9 33,7 7,4 79
Stand. residuals -0,6 1,1 -0,9
MALE
Count 38 24 9 71
expected count 34,1 30,3 6,6 71
Stand. residuals 0,7 -1,1 0,9
Totale
Count 72 64 14 150
expected count 72 64 14 150
χ2 (2) = 4.95, p < .084
Table 13.
GENDER MOST FREQUENT RECOGNITION CATEGORY
 Personal Group national global Totale
Famale
Count 8 2 16 52 79
expected count 12,6 2,6 19,5 40,6 79
Stand.
residuals
-1,3 -0,4 -0,8 1,8
Male
Count 16 3 21 25 71
expected count 11,4 2,4 17,5 36,4 71
Stand.
residuals
1,4 0,4 0,8 -1,9
Totale
Count 24 5 37 77 150
expected count 24 5 37 77 150
χ2  (4)  =  16.20,  p  <  .003.  The  standard  residuals  greater  than  1.7  are
highlighted in bold.
A chi-square test was applied to determine whether gender and “reasoned
score” were associated. Results shows an association between gender and
“full  understanding response of common good” (C3 + D3) (χ2 (2) =
16.4, p < .0001) (Table 14). The examination of the standardized residuals
shows that there is a higher representation of females (1.8) and a lower
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representation  of  males  (-1.9)  in  C3_D3  high  score  and,  contrary,  a
higher  representation  of  males  (2.2)  and  a  lower  representation  of
females (-2.1) in C3_D3 low score; for the other category there are no
significant associations. 
Table 14.
GENDER C3_D3
C3_D3 low C3_D3 mid
C3_D3
high
Totale
Female
Count 13 38 28 79
expected count 23,2 35,8 20 79
Stand. Residuals -2,1 0,4 1,8
Male
Count 31 30 10 71
expected count 20,8 32,2 18 71
Stand. Residuals 2,2 -0,4 -1,9
Totale
Count 44 68 38 150
expected count 44 68 38 150
χ2 (2) = 16.4, p < .0001. The standard residuals greater than 1.7 are highlighted in bold.
Also the overall reasoned score shows an association with gender (χ2
(2) = 6.5, p < .03) (Table 15). However the examination of the standardized
residuals  shows  no  significant  differentiations  even  if  it  is  possibile  to
underline  an  higher  representation  of  females  (1.4)  and  a  lower
representation  of  males  (-1.4)  in  high  comprehension  score  and,
contrary, a tendency to a higher representation of males (1.1) and a
lower representation of females (-1.1) in low comprehension score. 
Table 15.
GENDER
 
OVERALL_REASONED_SCORE
  
low 
comprehension
Diffused
high 
comprehension
totale
famale Count 7 52 20 79
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expected 
count
10,5 53,7 14,7 79,0
Stand. 
residuals
-1,1 -,2 1,4  
male
Count 13 50 8 71
expected 
count
9,5 48,3 13,3 71,0
Stand. 
residuals
1,1 ,2 -1,4  
Count 20 102 28 150
expected 
count
20,0 102,0 28,0 150,0
χ2 (2) = 6.5, p < .03
c) SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS. 
A chi-square test was applied to determine whether SES and “orientaton
scores”  were associated.  Results shows an association between  socio-
economic status and personal orientation score (χ2 (4) = 12.9, p < .01)
(Table 16). The examination of the standardized residuals shows that there
is a  higher representation of subject with low socio economic status
(2.4) and a lower representation of subject with high socio-economic
status (-1.9) in personal high score. Contrary,  even if  the score is not
significant, there is a a trend of lower representation of subiects with low
socio-economic status (-1.1)  and a higher representation of  subject
with high socio-economic status (1.2) in personal low score. For the
other category orientation scores there are no significant associations
with socio-economic status. Similar outcomes are emerged with respect
to the  association between socio-economic status and  overall orientation
scores; in fact, even if the overall orientation score is not significant, the
analysis of the most frequent category standardized residuals (χ2 (8) =
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20.9,  p < .007)  (Table 17) shows that  low status subjects are more
present in personal category (2.7) and, on the contrary,  high status
subjects are less present in personal category (-1.7).
Table 16.
PERSONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
Low Med High Totale
Low
Count 11 24 24 59
expected count 15,3 24,8 18,9 59
Stand. residuals -1,1 -0,2 1,2
Mid
Count 10 23 18 51
expected count 13,3 21,4 16,3 51
Stand. residuals -0,9 0,3 0,4
High
Count 18 16 6 40
expected count 10,4 16,8 12,8 40
Stand. residuals 2,4 -0,2 -1,9
Totale
Count 39 63 48 150
expected count 39 63 48 150
(χ2  (4)  =  12.9,  p  <  .01).  The  standard  residuals  greater  than  1.7  are
highlighted in bold.
Table 17.
SOCIO
ECONOMIC
STATUS
MOST FREQUENT RECOGNITION CATEGORY
personal Group national Global Totale
Low
Count 13 2 8 15 39
expected
count
6,2 1,3 9,6 20,0 39,0
Stand.
residuals
2,7 ,6 -,5 -1,1
Mid
Count 8 1 20 33 63
expected
count
10,1 2,1 15,5 32,3 63,0
Stand.
residuals
-,7 -,8 1,1 ,1
High
Count 3 2 9 29 48
expected
count
7,7 1,6 11,8 24,6 48,0
Stand.
residuals
-1,7 ,3 -,8 ,9
Totale
Count 24 5 37 77 150
expected
count
24,0 5,0 37,0 77,0 150,0
(χ2  (8)  =  20.9,  p  <  .007).  The  standard  residuals  greater  than  1.7  are
highlighted in bold.
127
The reasoned scores show an association between “totally self-interest
response” and SES (χ2 (4) = 14.9, p < .005) (Table 18). The examination
of the standardized residuals shows that there is a higher representation
of  subjects  with  low  socio  economic  status  (2.7)  and  a  lower
representation of subject with high socio-economic status (-2) in high
“A1+A2+A3” score. Contrary, even if the standardized residuals are not
significant, it is useful to underline  a trend of  lower representation of
subiects  with  low  socio-economic  status  (-1.2)  and  a  higher
representation of  subjects  with high  socio-economic status  (1.3)  in
low “A1+A2+A3”  score. 
There  is  an  association  between  “full  understanding  response  of
common  good”  (χ2  (4)  =  11.3,  p  <  .02)  (Table  19) and  SES.  The
examination of  the  standardized  residuals  shows  that  there  is  a  higher
representation of subject with low socio economic status (1.6) in low
“C3+D3” score and, contrary,  a  lower representation of subiects with
low socio-economic status (-1.9) in high “C3+D3” score.
Table 18.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS A1_A2_A3
Low Med high Total
Low
Count 12 11 16 39
expected count 17,2 13,5 8,3 39
Stand. residuals -1,2 -0,7 2,7
Mid
Count 27 24 12 63
expected count 27,7 21,8 13,4 63
Stand. residuals -0,1 0,5 -0,4
High
Count 27 17 4 48
expected count 21,1 16,6 10,2 48
Stand. residuals 1,3 0,1 -2
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Totale
Count 66 52 32 150
expected count 66 52 32 150
(χ2  (4)  =  14.9,  p  <  .005).  The  standard  residuals  greater  than  1.7  are
highlighted in bold.
Table 19.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS C3_D3
Low Med high Total
Low
Count 17 18 4 39
expected count 11,4 17,7 9,9 39
Stand. residuals 1,6 0,1 -1,9
Mid
Count 17 24 22 63
expected count 18,5 28,6 16 63
Stand. residuals -0,3 -0,9 1,5
High
Count 10 26 12 48
expected count 14,1 21,8 12,2 48
Stand. residuals -1,1 0,9 0
Totale
Count 44 68 38 150
expected count 44 68 38 150
(χ2  (4)  =  11.3,  p  <  .02).  The  standard  residuals  greater  than  1.7  are
highlighted in bold.
Finally the overall reasoned score shows an association with SES (χ2 (4)
= 16.2, p < .007) (Table 20). The examination of the standardized residuals
shows that there is a higher representation of low status subject (2.1) in
low comprehension score and, contrary, an lower representation of low
status subject (-2.3) in high comprehension score.
Table 20.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS OVERALL REASONED SCORE
low
comprehesnion
Diffused
high
comprehension
Total
Low Count 10 28 1 39
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expected count 5,2 26,5 7,3 39,0
Stand. residuals 2,1 ,3 -2,3
Mid Count 7 41 15 63
expected count 8,4 42,8 11,8 63,0
Stand. residuals -,5 -,3 ,9
High Count 3 33 12 48
expected count 6,4 32,6 9,0 48,0
Stand. residuals -1,3 ,1 1,0
χ2 (4) = 16.2, p < .00. The standard residuals greater than 2 are highlighted in
bold.
c. DISCUSSION
The  socio-moral  reflection  is  hypothesized  to  be  the  most  important
reference  construct  for  both  orientation  and  reasoned  score.  The
Orientation  to  the  Common  Good  Questionnaire  (OCGQ)  achieves
acceptable association with Socio-moral Reflection Measure-Short Form
(SRM-SF).
The results are consistent with the initial theoretical hypotheses, showing
a satisfactory concurrent validity between the OCGQ and the SRM-SF and
a consistent convergent validity with gender and socio-economic status.
The  personal  orientation  on  one  side  and  the  national  and  global
orientations on the other side show correlations of opposite sign compared
to SRM-SF.
The  personal  orientation  score  is  negatively  correlated  to  socio-
moral  reflection and the  subjects  characterized  by  a  personal  overall
orientation  are  more represented in  lower socio-moral  global  stage
(2.5 global stage).  Such findings  confirm a strong self-centred and
egocentric bias below such type of orientation to the common good.
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Such superficiality  and self-centred bias are  consistent  with  the results
relative  to  the  reasoned  scores.   Indeed,  “not  qualified  response”
(B1_C1_D1) show negative correlations to socio-moral reflection and
low common good comprehension subjects are  lower represented in
high socio-moral  global  stage (3.5  global  stage)  and higher  in  low
stage (2.5 global stage).  Such findings evidence that a low understanding
of  common good issues are  connected  to  a  low socio-moral  reflection
stage.   These  lower  levels  of  socio-moral  reflection  reflect  the  lack  of
active  internalization  of  values  and  norms  (connected  to  a  full
understanding of  the common good) and awareness of  personal moral
implications  as  a  mature  adult  in  such  public  ethics  situations.
Conversely,  the  nation  and  global  orientation  scores  are  positively
correlated to socio-moral reflection and the subjects characterized by
an  overall  global-national orientation are more represented in high
socio-moral global stage (3.5 global stage) and less in low stage (2.5
global stage).   Likewise,  “full understanding response “ of common
good (C3_D3) are strongly correlated to socio-moral reflection  (more
than  just  internalized  response –  C2_D2),  highlighting  furthermore  that
high common good comprehension subjects are more represented in
high socio-moral global stage (3.5 global stage) and less in low stage
(2.5  global  stage).   Those results  confirm that  society as a  whole  is
correlated to orientations to the common good connected to  more
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complex  societal  groups –  nation,  supra-national  and  global  society.
Moreover, it is evident that a more elevated level of socio-moral reflection
allows the subjects to question societal values and rules reaching a higher
understanding of the common good, removing egocentric bias.
The  group  orientation,  that  does  not  show any  significant  correlations,
deserves  a  separate  discussion.   This  finding  must  be  analysed  with
subsequent empirical analysis in order to better understand if it must be
brought back to the structuring of the dilemmas and response alternative
or to a consistent finding relative to the sample.
Coherently with  findings relative  to social  perspective taking and moral
reasoning, I found a difference in orientation to the common good in
favour of women.  It  is  interesting to notice that girls show not only a
higher  level  of  global  orientation  with  respect  to  boys,  but  that  such
difference is even more relevant when referring to “full understanding of
common good” (C3_D3).   The socio-economic status, instead, shows
significant  correlations  to  low level  of  orientation to  the  common
good such as personal  orientation,  being negative  related to  high
level of comprehension to the common good.  This finding seems to
underline  SES  as  a  prerequisite  for  the  development  of  a  more
mature orientation to the common good,  but not sufficient for the
development of a higher level of common good.
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It  will  be useful,  in  successive findings,  to study the influence of  these
socio-demographic  variables  in  relation  to  a  greater  sample  more
distributed by age, taking into account other connected aspects such as
parenting style, school experiences, and so on. 
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CHAPTER V
RELATIONS OF VALUES, 
CIVIC MORAL DISENGAGEMENT , 
137
CIVIC BEHAVIOR AND THE ORIENTATION 
TOWARDS THE COMMON GOOD.
INTRODUCTION.
Adolescence implies more chances for the person to be engaged in the
wider context of work or community activities, with increased exposure to
socially  regulated  behaviours  or  significant  socializing  experiences  (in
particular with authority figures and peers), and becoming aware of his or
her  social  roles  and  responsibilities.    Through  such  experience,  the
adolescents  gain  a  distinctive  set  of  values  and  beliefs,  looking  at
themselves as “autonomous, rational and moral agents in a larger society”
(Moshman, 2011).  These aspects explain adolescents’ understandings of
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their social world, defining their moral social understanding and behaviour.
In the present study, the aim was to further explore the orientation to the
common god considering the correlations with other relevant dimensions
of  moral  and  perspective  taking  functioning  in  other  theoretical
approaches:  personal  values  (Schwartz,  1992),  moral  disengagement
(Bandura, 1991) and civic engagement (Younnis & Metz, 2007).
Personal  values refer  to  motivational  determinants  of  behaviour  that
transcend specific situations and serve as general criteria to select and
evaluate our decisions and actions.   According to the hypothesis, self-
transcendence  values  direct  attention  to  others’  needs  and  promote
orientation  to  the  common  good,  whereas  self-enhancement  values
legitimize selfish behaviours and allows individuals to avoid involvement
with  others  in  need  (Schwartz,  2010;  Schwartz  &  Howard,  1984).   As
amply explained in  the first  chapter,  for “others”  it  is  intended different
social  groups as an  extension  (family,  small  community,  the  state,  the
whole humanity) in which the person is included in various ways.
Conversely,  civic  moral  disengagement refers  to  social  cognitive
mechanisms  that  allow  people  to  perform  harmful  actions  without
experiencing  feelings  of  guilt  or  denying  their  own  moral  principles
(Bandura,  1991).    Civic  moral  disengagement  could  promote  the
avoidance  of  moral  responsibilities  towards  others  or  one’s  own social
group,  allowing  people  to  put  in  the  foreground  their  own  needs.
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Individual responsibility shows a central role in understanding this issue
within social life and has implications for communities as a whole (Latane
& Darley, 1970).
Finally,  consistent with perspective taking and moral judgment theories,
civic  engagement  occasions  –  connected  to  the  implementation  of
social interaction experiences and social opportunities – are crucial with
respect  to  the  ability  of  the  person  to  experiment  and  develop  a  high
mature reasoning with regard to social issues.
PERSONAL VALUES.  Basic personal values refer to the broad goals to
which people attribute importance as guiding principles in their lives.  There
has  been  considerable  theorizing  on  the  important  relationships  among
values,  moral  reasoning and ethical  behaviour (Schwartz 2006; Ravlin  &
Meglino 1987, Lan et al. 2008; Weber 1993, Thoma 194; Helkama et al.
2003,  Abdolmohammadi  &  Baker  2006).  Weber  (1993)  advanced  a
theoretical  connection  between  moral  reasoning  and  personal  values,
establishing that moral reasoning is the “intermediate step whereby values
were translated into action”.  The present  study refer  to Schwartz  (1992)
theory of  basic  personal  values.  He (Schwartz  2006)  states  that  people
become aware of  their  priorities  among values  only  when judgments or
actions have conflicting implications in the light of different and important
values such as establishing a priority among achieving justice, novelty or
tradition.    Schwartz  (1992)  defined  values  as  transcending  specific
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situations and reflecting what is desirable, providing empirical evidence of a
universal  set  of  values in  a  steady  and integrated  relationship  with  one
another (Rohan 2000).  He proposed and provided substantial support for
the  universal  existence  of  ten  value  types  (Schwartz  1999;  Schwartz  &
Rubel 2005; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995) from
universal  requirements  of  the  human  condition:  power,  achievement,
hedonism, stimulation,  self-direction,  universalism,  benevolence, tradition,
conformity,  and  security.    Each  value  expresses  a  distinct  motivational
goal.   The 10 values form a motivational continuum based on their pattern
of  compatibility  and  conflict.   The  value  types  exhibit  internal  reliability,
temporal  stability,  external  validity  and  are  uncontaminated  by  social
desirability (Bardi & Schwartz 203).  Schwartz clarifies the relationship of
one value type with another, positioning conflicting value types opposite one
another  and complementary value types beside one another  in a quasi-
circumplex  array  (Schwartz  1992,  Schwartz  &  Sagic  1995,  Schwartz  &
Boehnke 2004).  In this study, the focus has been placed on the contrast
between  self-transcendence  and  self-enhancement  values.  The
universalism and benevolence self-transcendence values imply a vision of
wider perspective taking emphasizing attention to others’ needs, accepting
others as equals and concern for their welfare.  They conflict with  power
and  achievement  self-enhancement  values that  encourage  pursuing
one’s own relative success and dominance over others, legitimizing selfish
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behaviours  and  allowing  individuals  to  avoid  involvement  with  others  in
need  (Schwartz,  2010,  Schwartz  &  Howard,  1984).   Hedonism  shares
elements  of  openness  to  change  and  self  enhancement.   Studies
highlighted  that  individual  values  like  benevolence  (Stolle  and  Hooghe,
2002)  and  universalism  (Marta,  Rossi,  &  Boccacin,  1999;  Vechione  &
Mebane, 2006) have a strong relationship with civic engagement (Caprara
et  al.,  2009;  Vecchione  &  Mebane,  2006;  Luengo  Kanacri,  Rosa,  &  Di
Giunta,  2012),  referring  to  two  aspects  of  the  same  collective  core
dimension.   Whereas  the  former  is  related  with  the  preservation  and
concern for the well-being of people in closer relationships (family, school,
neighbourhood), the latter is related with helping conduct towards people
and society as a whole (Schwartz, 2006).  In this sense it was hypothesized
that  the preference for a specific  typology of  orientation to the common
good is influenced by personal goals and values in a given context, which
may eventually conflict  (values emphasizing concern for the welfare and
interests of different social groups in which the person is included conflict
with  values  emphasising  the  pursuit  of  one’s  own  interests).   In  the
proposed theorization of  orientation to the common good, in fact,  it  was
assumed that same individual may exhibit different typologies of reasoning,
related  to  different  levels  of  orientation.   So,  mature  orientation  to  the
common good implies the propensity to prefer, among different typologies,
the  one  based  on  a  sense  of  individual  responsibility  towards  a  larger
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community.  In these kinds of situations, the relative importance of different
individual  values  system  “should  be  reflected  in  the  choice  of  moral
justifications,  as  well  as  in  the  relative  salience  of  various  modes  of
reasoning”(Eisenberg,  1986).   Consequently,  the  chosen  typology  of
orientation to the common good could be also a function of  motivational
determinants,  such  as  personal  values  acquired  during  individual
development that are affected by social norms in the specific community
context (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).
CIVIC MORAL DISENGAGEMENT. Bandura (1991) in his theory on moral
agency  considered  people  as  active  agents  who  follow  their  aims  in
agreement  with  personal  values.   People  check  their  comportment  and
consider  their  actions  against  their  own  moral  standards  and  perceived
circumstances,  regulating  their  behaviour  by  anticipating  possible
consequences.   People  use  self-pride  and  self-blame  as  regulatory
capacities that keep behaviour in line with moral standards.  In fact, civic
moral disengagement consists in a disinhibitory cognitive distortion Gibbs,
Potter, & Goldsteing, 1995) through which people may accept their amoral
act, not contradict their personal values and social norms (Bandura, 1991;
Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Paciello, Fida
Tramontano, Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008).  Moving from such evidence, it
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was hypothesized that the use of self-serving mechanisms such as civic
moral disengagement play an important role in orientation to the common
good.  It allows the person to perceive personal interest as an appropriate
orientation  in  the  social  realm,  avoiding  a  felt  assumption  of  individual
responsibility and perseverance to follow their own aims.
CIVIC  ENGAGEMENT.  A  growing  recent  trend  in  research  (Killen  and
Smetana,  2010,  Moshman,  2008)  has  evidenced that  growing up in  a
diverse environment – through the exposure to numerous beliefs, values
and practice  –  can raise different  social  attitudes (Killen &  Smetana,
2010).  This  indicates  that  adolescents  can  profoundly  differ  in  their
commitments  and  dispositions  towards social  issues (Aboud,  2008;
Brown  &  Bigler,  2005)  in  relation  to  their  different  involvement  and
engagement  in  their  communities  and  society (Flanagan  2004b,
Sherrod  et  al.  2002).   Youniss  and  Yates  (1997)  evidenced  that
participation in large social  contexts (service learning,  involvement  in
community  organizations,  etc.)  contributes  to  moral  development  by
producing  an  active  and  aware  interest  in  addressing  community
problems.  Different studies have confirmed that involvement in a broad
community  influences  the  development  of  a  greater  feeling  of
interconnection  between citizens  (Yates  and  Youniss  1996),  attitudes  of
care and attachment to the larger social order (Flanagan 2004b, Flanagan
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& Faison 2002) and civic or moral identity (Hart & Fegley 1995, Youniss et
al. 1997, Youniss & Yates 1999), predominantly if people have the chance
to reflect on their participation in the same social context  (Youniss et al.
1999).   All  those  aspects  are  clearly  associated  with  the  theoretical
approach to the common good used in this study, in particular with the idea
that social experiences play a fundamental role in the development of social
perspective  taking  and,  consequently,  of  the  orientation  to  the  common
good.  Thus, civic engagement – intended as actions that are carried out
with the aim of improving the community in a public and non-profit context
(Youniss & Metz, 2007; Obradovi & Masten, 2007; Kirlin, 2002) – can be
seen as a central pathway in the development of responsible citizenship.
AIM AND HYPOTHESES OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Based  on  Schwartz’s  theory  on  basic  human  values,  Bandura’s  moral
disengagement  theory  and  civic  engagement  evidences,  it  was
hypothesized correlations of such constructs – personal values, civic moral
disengagment and civic engagment – with orientation towards the common
good. The study refer to both positive moral functioning, which promotes
behaviours that support an orientation to high levels of orientations to the
common  good,  and  negative  moral  functioning,  which  promotes  an
orientation to the common good that protect one’s own interest. The  aim is
to verify the relationships between different kinds of value and orientation to
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the  common  good  expressed;  perform  an  analysis  of  the  civic  moral
disengagement and of civic participation verifying the relationship with the
orientation to the common good. The main hypotheses of the study are the
following:
1. self-transcendence values have a positve correlation with higher single
oreintations scores (national and global scores) and more reasoned scores
(“internalized but not up-reasoned response” (C2 + D2) and finally (C3 +
D3)  “full  understanding  response  of  common  good”),  since  self-
transcendence values prioritize the sense of responsibility and a profound
concern for the others and the community; in parallel,  self-enhancement
values have a positive correlation with personal orientation score and to
“not qualified response” and “totally self-interest response reasoned scores,
since  selfenhancement  values  prioritize  an  individual’s  own  interest  and
consequently  may  foster  self-serving  mechanisms  and  less  mature
hedonistic  processes;  conversely  personal  orientation  score  and  low
reasoned scores (that fere to: (B1 + C1 + D1) “not qualified response of
common good” and (A1 + A2 + A3) “totally self-interest response”) negative
correalte  with  self-transcendence  values  and  positive  with  self-
enhancement values;
2.  civic moral disengagment will tend to negatively correlate with higher
orientation scores (national  and global  scores)  and high resoned scores
(“internalized but not up-reasoned response” (C2 + D2) and finally (C3 +
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D3)  “full  understanding  response  of  common  good”),  favouring  the
expression of personal orientations to the common good and  “not qualified
response” and “totally self-interest response;
3. civic engagement will positively correlate with higher single oreintations
scores (national and global scores) and overall orientation score, and also
to the evoluted reasoned score (“full understanding response of common
good” – C3 + D3).
b. METHOD
1. PARTICIPANTS. 
Partecipants  included  150  students  from  three  high  schools  in  Rome,
balanced by sex (71 males – 47.3% and 79 females – 52.7%) and ranged in
age from 14 to 21 years, with an average of 17.11 years and a standard
deviation of 1.538. The socio-econmic status (SES) ratings of the familiesd
ranged from 8 to 18 , with means of 13,37 (SD = 3,1).
2. MEASURE. 
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a) ORIENTATION  TO  THE  COMMON  GOOD  QUESTIONNAIRE.  As
previously  discussed,  the  Orientation  to  the  Common  Good
Questionnaire (OCGQ) is a measuring used to determine participant’s
orientation to the common good (personal, group, national and global)
and the reasoned quality of response actively produced by the subject. It
contains  fifteen  moral  dilemmas,  each  of  which  is  followed  by  three
statements.  The  participants  choose  one  of  the  statement  and  then
actively explain the reasons for their choice. The scores from the OCGQ
– outcome of the encoding performed by an encoder – were calculated
refferring to  single orientation score (personal,  group,  national  and
global score) and  overall orientation score (frequency and compute)
and  to  reasoned score (that  fere  to:  (B1 + C1 + D1)  “not  qualified
response  of  common  good”,  (A1  +  A2  +  A3)  “totally  self-interest
response”, (C2 + D2) “internalized but not up-reasoned response” and
finally (C3 + D3)  “full understanding response of common good”) and
overall reasoned score (that fere to: strong comprehension of common
good  (subjects  with  high  C3+D3  and  low  A1+A2+A3);  low
comprehension of  common good (subjects with  low C3+D3 and high
A1+A2+A3);  finally,  an intermediate group,  where there is  no type of
comprehension predominant).
b) VALUES.   Values  was  measured  using  the  Portrait  Values
Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz, 2005b; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann,
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Burgess & Harris, 2001).  The PVQ includes 40 short verbal portraits of
different  people,  each  describing  a  person’s  goals,  aspirations,  or
wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value.  For example,
“It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him.
Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them”
describes  a  person  who  holds  universalism  values  important.   The
PVQ measures each of the 10 motivationally distinct types of values
with from three to six items.  For each portrait, respondents indicate
how similar the person is to themselves on a scale ranging from “very
much like me” to “not like me at all”.  We inferred respondents’ own
values from the implicit values of the people they considered as similar
to themselves.  Studies in seven countries supported the reliability of
the PVQ for measuring the 10 values (Scwartz, 2005b).  Multimethod-
multitrait  analyses  in  Germany,  Israel  and  Ukraine  compared
measurements of  the 10 values using the PVQ and with  an earlier
instrument that  was validated across 70 countries.   These analyses
confirmed the convergent  and discriminant  validity  of  the 10 values
measured  by  the  PVQ.   In  the  current  study,  the  alpha  reliability
coefficients ranged from.61 (tradition) to .83 (achievement).  Some of
the values have conceptually broad definitions, encompassing multiple
components  (e.g.,  tradition  includes  both  self-restriction  and  faith).
Measurement of these values with only three to six items may account
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for their  relatively  low internal  consistency.   The PVQ indexes have
demonstrated predictive validity for numerous behaviours and attitudes
(Schwartz, 2005b; Schwartz et al., 2001).
c) CIVIC MORAL DISENGAGEMENT. A specific measure was developed
to assess civic moral disengagement which proved internal and external
validity (Caprara & Capanna, 2005; Caprara et  al.,  2006).  The Civic
Moral Disengagement scale (Caprara et al., 2009) contains 32 items,
four for each civic moral disengagement mechanism (moral justification,
euphemistic  language,  advantageous  comparison,  displacement  of
responsibility,  diffusion  of  responsibility,  distorting  consequences,
attribution of  blame,  and  dehumanization)  with  a  5-point  Likert  scale
(from 1 = agree not at all, to 5=completely agree) response format. The
content of the items refers to minor ethical code and norm violations in
the context of daily transactions ("Evading taxes cannot be considered
reprehensible  considering  the  squandering  of  public  money”;  “When
there  are  no  efficient  refuse  disposal  services,  there  is  no  sense
reproaching citizens who leave trash on the street”). Cronbach’s alpha of
the 32-items CMD scale for this study was 0.95.
d) CIVIC ENGAGEMENT. Civic engagement was determined to be a latent
variable  encompassing  three types  of  behaviour  (see  Sherrod et  al.,
2010):  belonging  to  civic  associations  and  involvement  as  an  active
citizen.  Participants were asked to indicate their degree of involvement
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in different associations (e.g., cultural and student associations) on five
items (1 = never, to 5 = regular participation; alpha = .81).  Self-reports
on five additional items (1 = never, to 5 = often/very often) assessed
involvement as an active citizen (e.g., “sign a petition to support a good
cause,” “giving money to a political or social campaign” alpha = .69).
Adding the two scores I calculated an overall score of civic engagement.
3. PROCEDURES.
Participants were recruited from three high schools in Rome. The subject,
divide into classrooms, completed the measures in a quiet setting. During
the  session  participants  were  first  asked  to  read  and  sign  an  informed
consent form. The signed consent forms were then collected and placed
together  in  a  separate  packet  to  keep  the  experimental  material
anonymous. The participants were then given a questionnaire packet and
asked to read it carefully and fill it out completely, but to not put their name.
Participants were told to take as much time as they needed to fill out the
packet.  Once  completed,  participants  turned  in  their  packets  to  the
researcher  who put the experimental  material  into an envelope separate
from the consent forms. 
c. RESULTS
Bi-variate Spearman correlational analyses were conducted to examine(1)
relations among all orientations to the common good scores and values,
(2) relations among the orientations to the common good and civic moral
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disengagement, and (3) relations among the different orientations to the
common good scores and  civic engagement scores/subscores.
1) RELATIONS AMONG ALL ORIENTATIONS TO THE COMMON GOOD
SCORES AND VALUES.
The correlations between the orientation scores and values are reported in
Table 21. Personal orientation is negatively correlated to Benevolence (r
= -0,17, p < .05). and Universalism (r = -0,20, p < .05)., while it is positively
connected to Hedonism and Power (respectively: r = 0,3, p < .01 and r =
0,19, p < .05). The same values are associated to global orientation, but
in  the  opposite  direction.  Global  score  is  positively  correlated  to
Benevolence (r = 0,18, p < .05) and Universalism (r = 0,38, p < .01), while is
negatively related to Hedonism and Power (respectively: r = 0,334, p < .01
and r = -0,22, p < .01). Also National orientation is positively correlated to
Universalism (r = 0,17, p < .05) and highlights also a positive correlation to
Tradition (r  =  0,20,  p  <  .05)  and  Stimulation (r  =  0,19,  p  <  .05).  No
correlation was found between the group orientation and the different
values score.
Table 21.
VALUES ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD
 Personal Group National Global
CONF -0,004 -0,13 0,135 ,192*
TRAD -0,064 -0,079 ,197* 0,112
BENEV -,173* -0,09 0,131 ,184*
UNIV -,198* -0,087 ,177* ,376**
SELFD -0,111 -0,058 0,131 0,142
STIM -0,01 -0,012 ,187* -0,008
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HEDON ,299** -0,009 -0,08 -,239**
ACHIE 0,132 -0,011 0,063 -0,09
POW ,194* -0,034 0,072 -,223**
SECUR 0,045 -,182* ,204* 0,008
*p  < .05; **p <.01
As shown  also  by the following  correlation  with  the  “compute  overall
orientation  score”,  the  most  relevant  positive  association  is  to
Universalism  (  r  =  0.18,  p  <  .05) and  the  most  significant  negative
association   is  to  Hedonism (  r  =  0.276,  p  <  .01).   There  is  also  a
significant positive correlation to Benevolence ( r = 0.213, p < .01) and a
significant negative correlation to Power ( r = -0.16, p < .05).
Table 22.
VALUES ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD
 COMPUTE OVERALL ORIENTATION SCORE
CONF 0,116
TRAD 0,153
BENEV ,213**
UNIV ,334**
SELFD 0,159
STIM 0,087
HEDON -,276**
ACHIE -0,072
POW -,163*
SECUR 0,02
*p  < .05; **p <.01
A chi-square test was applied to determine whether values and “frequency
overall reasoned score””  were associated. In order to divide the values
scores into three groups (high, medium and low) were used as cut for each
group the percentiles of  reference and therefore recategorized  the  data.
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The following Table 23 confirm an association between  Universalism (χ2
(4) = 16.2, p < .007) and  Benevolence (χ2 (4) = 11.7, p < .02) and the
“frequency overall  reasoned score”.  The examination of the standardized
residuals  shows  that  in  global/national  cateogry  there  is  an  higher
representation of high universalism subjects (2.6) and a lower of low
universalism subjects (-1.9) and the opposite in personal category, with
higher  low universalism subjects  (1.7)  and lower high universalism
subjects (-1.8). The examination of the standardized residuals shows that
subjects with low benevolence are less represented in global/national
cateogry  (-1.8).  The  Selfdeterminism show  an  association  to  the
frequency overall orientation score (χ2 (4) = 12.0, p < .01). The examination
of  the  standardized  residuals  displays  that  subjects  with  low
selfdetermination are less represented in global/national cateogry (-
1.8)  and  more  in  personal  cateogry  (1.9),  while  subjects  with  high
selfdetermination  are  more  present  in  global/national  category
(1.3)and less inpersonal (-1.6).
Table 23.
FREQUENCY OVERALL
ORIENTATION SCORE
UNIVERSALISM
Low Mid High Totale
DIFFUSED
Conteggio 28 26 18 72
Conteggio
atteso
23 22,6 26,4 72
Residui stand. 1 0,7 -1,6
GLOBAL/NATIONAL
Conteggio 12 16 36 64
Conteggio
atteso
20,5 20,1 23,5 64
Residui stand. -1,9 -0,9 2,6
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PERSONAL
Conteggio 8 5 1 14
Conteggio
atteso
4,5 4,4 5,1 14
Residui stand. 1,7 0,3 -1,8
Total
Conteggio 48 47 55 150
Conteggio
atteso
48 47 55 150
χ2 (4) = 21.5, p < .0001. The standard residuals greater than 1.7 are highlighted in bold.
FREQUENCY OVERALL ORIENTATION
SCORE
SELF DETERMINISM
Low mid High Totale
Diffused
Conteggio 28 24 20 72
Conteggio atteso 24,5 25 22,6 72
Residui stand. 0,7 -0,2 -0,5
global/national
Conteggio 14 24 26 64
Conteggio atteso 21,8 22,2 20,1 64
Residui stand. -1,7 0,4 1,3
personal
Conteggio 9 4 1 14
Conteggio atteso 4,8 4,9 4,4 14
Residui stand. 1,9 -0,4 -1,6
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FREQUENCY OVERALL ORIENTATION
SCORE
BENEVOLENCE
Low mid High Totale
DIFFUSED
Conteggio 30 19 23 72
Conteggio atteso 25,4 22,1 24,5 72
Residui stand. 0,9 -0,7 -0,3
GLOBAL/NATIONAL
Conteggio 14 24 26 64
Conteggio atteso 22,6 19,6 21,8 64
Residui stand. -1,8 1 0,9
PERSONAL
Conteggio 9 3 2 14
Conteggio atteso 4,9 4,3 4,8 14
Residui stand. 1,8 -0,6 -1,3
Total
Conteggio 53 46 51 150
Conteggio atteso 53 46 51 150
Χ2 (4) = 11.7, p < .02. The standard 
residuals greater than 1.7 are 
highlighted in bold.
Total
Conteggio 51 52 47 150
Conteggio atteso 51 52 47 150
χ2 (4) = 12.0, p < .01. The standard 
residuals greater than 1.7 are highlighted 
in bold. 
The correlations between the reasoned score with the PVQ are presented
in Table 24.  “Totally self-interest response” (A1+ A2+A3)  is positively
realted to Hedonism (r = 0,30, p < .01) and Power (r = 0,20, p < .05), while
it is negative related to Benevolence (r = 0,16, p < .05) and Universalism
(r  =  0,19,  p  <  .05).  Conversely,  “internalized  but  not  up-reasoned
response”  (C2+D2) and  “full  understanding  response  of  common
good” (C3+D3) are positively realted to Unversalism with a different grade
(respectively: r = 0,27, p < .01 and r = 0,35, p < .01).  C3+D3 cateogry is
also negative correlated to Hedonism and Power (respectively: r = -0,22,
p < .01 and r = -0,23, p < .01).  The C2+D2 category present a positive
correlation to Tradition (r = 0,23, p < .01) and Security (r = 0,23, p < .01).
Table 24.
production
score Values
 CONF TRAD BENEV UNIV SELFD STIM HEDON ACHIE POW SECUR
B1_C1_D1 0,024 -0,008 0,016 -0,153 -0,016 0,069 0,054 0,057 0,155 0,008
A1_A2_A3 -0,031 -0,054 -,164* -,194* -0,106 0,05 ,300** 0,124 ,202* 0,06
C2_D2 ,191* ,234** 0,11 ,275** 0,127 ,161* -0,062 0,12 0,016 ,232**
C3_D3 0,155 0,054 ,178* ,352** 0,147 0,021 -,221** -0,065 -,230** 0,01
*p  < .05; **p <.01    
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A chi-square test was applied to determine whether values and “overall
reasoned  score”  were  associated.  Results  showed  that there is  an
association between “overall reasoned score” and Universalism (χ2 (4)
= 13.3,  p < .01)  (Table 25). Examination of  the standardized residuals
showed  that  there  is  a  higher  representation  of  high  universalism
subjects (1.8) and a lower of low universalism subjects (-1.7) in high
comprehension category and,   contrary,  a  higher  representation of
low  universalism  subjects  (1.8)  and  lower  of  high  universalism
subjects  (-2.0)  in  low  comprehension  category.  The  other  value
crosstabs  relating  to  total  overall  production  score  are  not
significant.
Table 25.
OVERALL REASONED SCORE UNIVERSALISM
low Mid High Totale
LOW COMPREHENSION
Conteggio 11 7 2 20
Conteggio atteso 6,4 6,3 7,3 20
Residui stand. 1,8 0,3 -2
DIFFUSED
Conteggio 33 32 37 102
Conteggio atteso 32,6 32 37,4 102
Residui stand. 0,1 0 0
HIGH COMPREHENSION
Conteggio 4 8 16 28
Conteggio atteso 9 8,8 10,3 28
Residui stand. -1,7 -0,3 1,8
Total
Conteggio 48 47 55 150
Conteggio atteso 48 47 55 150
χ2 (4) = 13.3, p < .01. The standard residuals 
greater than 1.7 are highlighted in bold.
2)  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  ORIENTATION  TO  THE  COMMON
GOOD AND CIVIC MORAL DISENGAGMENT. 
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The  correlations  between  the  orientation  scores  and  civic  moral
disengagment are reported in the following Table 26. It sohws a positivie
correlation to Personal orientation (r = -0,25, p < .01) and a  negative
correlation to global orientation (r = -0,36, p < .01). No correlation was
found between the national and group orientation and the civic moral
disengagment.  Largely  there  is  a  negative  correlation  to  compute
overall orientation score (r = -0,245, p < .01).
Table 26.
civic moral
disengagment orientation to the common good  
 Personal Group National Global
compute
overall
recognition
score
CMDS_TOT ,251** -0,031 0,013 -,360** -,245**
*p  < .05; **p <.01
A  chi-square  test  was  applied  to  determine  whether  civic  moral
disengagment and “frequency overall reasoned score”  were associated.
In  order  to  divide  the civic  moral  disengagment  score into  three groups
(high, medium and low) were used as cut for each group the percentiles of
reference and therefore recategorized the data. Results showed that there
is an association between civic moral disengagment and frequency overall
orientation score (χ2 (4) = 16.2, p < .007) and most frequent orientation
to the common good (χ2 (8) = 21.22, p < .007). While both are relevant,
the  examination  of  the  standardized  residuals  of  the  first  score  did  not
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highlight relevant differences.  In the second one, the crosstab stands out,
showing  a  tendency  of  subjects  with  high  CMDS  to  be  less  (-2.1)
represented in global orientation and more represented (2.3) in personal
orientation.  Consistently,  subjects with low CMDS are more represented
(2.3) in global orientation.
Table 27.
FREQUENCY OVERALL ORIENTATION 
SCORE
CMDS
Low Mid High Totale
Diffused
Conteggio 28 11 9 48
Conteggio atteso 23 20,5 4,5 48
Residui stand. 1 -2,1 2,1
global/national
Conteggio 25 21 3 49
Conteggio atteso 23,5 20,9 4,6 49
Residui stand. 0,3 0 -0,7
Personal
Conteggio 19 32 2 53
Conteggio atteso 25,4 22,6 4,9 53
Residui stand. -1,3 2 -1,3
Total
Conteggio 72 64 14 150
Conteggio atteso 72 64 14 150
χ2 (4) = 17.93, p < .001. The standard residuals 
greater than 2 are highlighted in bold.
CMDS
MOST FREQUENT ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON
GOOD
PERSONAL GROUP NATIONAL GLOBAL
HIGH
Conteggio 12 3 16 14
Conteggio atteso 7,7 1,6 11,8 24,6
Residui stand. 1,6 1,1 1,2 -2,1
MED
Conteggio 8 1 13 24
Conteggio atteso 7,8 1,6 12,1 25,2
Residui stand. 0,1 -0,5 0,3 -0,2
LOW
Conteggio 4 1 8 39
Conteggio atteso 8,5 1,8 13,1 27,2
Residui stand. -1,5 -0,6 -1,4 2,3
Totale
Conteggio 24 5 37 77
Conteggio atteso 24 5 37 77
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Χ2 (8) = 21.22, p < .007. The standard 
residuals greater than 2 are highlighted in 
bold.
The correlations between the reasoned score with the CMDS are presented
in  Table  28.  “Totally  self-interest  response”  (A1+  A2+A3)  and “not
qualified response of common good” (B1 + C1 + D1) are positively
realted to CMDS  (respectively: r = 0,28, p < .01 and r = 0,24, p < .01).
Conversely, “full understanding response of common good” (C3+D3) is
negatively correlated to CMDS (r = -0,427, p < .01).  The “internalized
but not up-reasoned response” (C2+D2) does not show a significant
correlation to CMDS.
Table 28.
ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD -
REASONED SCORE CIVIC MORAL DISENGAGMENT
CMDS_TOT
B1_C1_D1 ,240**
A1_A2_A3 ,285**
C2_D2 0,022
C3_D3 -,427**
*p  < .05; **p <.01
A  chi-square  test  was  applied  to  determine  whether  civic  moral
disengagment  and “overall  reasoned score”  were  associated.  Results
showed that there is  an association between civic  moral  disengagment
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and  “overall  reasoned score” (χ2 (4)  = 21.1,  p  < .0001) (Table 29).
Examination of the standardized residuals showed that there is a  higher
representation of high CMDS subjects (2.2) and a low of low CMDS
subjects  (-1.9)  in  low  CMDS  category and,  contrary,  a  high
representation of  low CMDS subjects (2.6)  and low of  high CMDS
subjects (-2.3) in high comprehension category.
Table 29.
CMDS  OVERALL REASONED SCORE  
  LOW DIFFUSED HIGH Totale
high 
Conteggio 12 34 2 48
Conteggio atteso 6,4 32,6 9 48
Residui stand. 2,2 0,2 -2,3
Mid
Conteggio 6 35 8 49
Conteggio atteso 6,5 33,3 9,1 49
Residui stand. -0,2 0,3 -0,4
Low
Conteggio 2 33 18 53
Conteggio atteso 7,1 36 9,9 53
Residui stand. -1,9 -0,5 2,6
Total
Conteggio 20 102 28 150
Conteggio atteso 20 102 28 150
χ2 (4) = 21.1, p < .0001. The standard 
residuals greater than 2 are 
highlighted in bold. 
3)  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  DIFFERENT  ORIENTATIONS  TO  THE
COMMON GOOD SCORES AND THE CIVIC ENGAGMENT SCORES. 
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The  correlations  between  the  orientation  scores  and  civic  engagment
scores are reported in the Table 30. “Belonging to civic associations” is
negatively correlated to Personal orientation (r = -0,25, p < .01) while it
is  positively  connected  to  Global  orientation  (r  =  0,17,  p  <  .05).
“Involvement  as  active  citizen” is  negatively  correlated to Personal
orientation (r  =  -0,34,  p  <  .01)  and  positively  related  to National
orientation (r = 0,16, p < .05). The civic engagment complessive score
show a negative correlation to Personal orientation (r = -0,29, p < .01).
The  overall  compute  orientation  score  show  a  positive  significant
correlation to “Involvement in different associations” (r = 0,28, p < .01),
“Involvement  as active  citizen” (r  =  0,35,  p  <  .01)  and overall  civic
engagment score (r = 0,28, p < .01). 
Table 30.
CIVIC ENGAGMENT ORIENTATION TO THE COMMON GOOD
 Personal Group National Global
compute
overall
recognitio
n score
Associations
involvement
-,256** 0,13 0,084 ,168* ,276**
Active citizen
involvement 
-,342** 0,118 ,164* 0,157 ,354**
Civic engagment_TOT -,286** 0,099 0,143 0,112 ,281**
*p  < .05; **p <.01
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A chi-square test was applied to determine whether civic engagment and
“frequency overall orientation score” were associated. In order to divide
the civic engagment scores into three groups (high, medium and low) were
used  as  cut  for  each  group  the  percentiles  of  reference  and  therefore
recategorized  the  data.  Results  showed  that there is  an  association
between  frequency  overall  orientation  score and  Associations
involvement (χ2 (4) = 16.79, p < .002) and Active citizen involvement (χ2
(4)  = 14.24,  p < .007) (Table 31).  The examination of  the standardized
residuals  showed  that  in  personal  category  there  is  an  higher
representation of low “Associations involvement” subjects (3.1) and
“active  citizen  involvement”  subjects  (2.2)  and  a  lower  of  high
“Associations involvement” subjects (-2.2) and of high “active citizen
involvement” subjects (-2.1).
Table 31.
ASSOCIATIONS INVOLVEMENT FREQUENCY OVERALL REASONED SCORE
DIFFUSED
GLOBAL/
NATIONAL
PERSONAL Totale
LOW
Conteggio 21 16 11 48
Conteggio atteso 23 20,5 4,5 48
Residui stand. -0,4 -1 3,1
MID
Conteggio 24 24 3 51
Conteggio atteso 24,5 21,8 4,8 51
Residui stand. 0 0,5 -0,8
HIGH
Conteggio 27 24 0 51
Conteggio atteso 24,5 21,8 4,8 51
Residui stand. 0,5 0,5 -2,2
Total
Conteggio 72 64 14 150
Conteggio atteso 72 64 14 150
χ2 (4) = 16.79, p < .002. The 
standard residuals greater than 2
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are highlighted in bold.
ACTIVE CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT FREQUENCY OVERALL ORIENTATION SCORE
DIFFUSED
GLOBAL/
NATIONAL
PERSONAL Totale
LOW
Conteggio 32 19 11 62
Conteggio atteso 29,8 26,5 5,8 62
Residui stand. 0,4 -1,4 2,2
MID
Conteggio 20 18 3 41
Conteggio atteso 19,7 17,5 3,8 41
Residui stand. 0,1 0,1 -0,4
HIGH
Conteggio 20 27 0 47
Conteggio atteso 22,6 20,1 4,4 47
Residui stand. -0,5 1,6 -2,1
Total
Conteggio 72 64 14 150
Conteggio atteso 72 64 14 150
χ2 (4) = 14.24, p < .007. The standard 
residuals greater than 2 are highlighted in 
bold.
A  chi-square  test  was  applied  to  determine  whether  overall civic
engagment  score and  “overall orientation  score”  were  associated.
Results showed that there is significant association (χ2 (4) = 17.4, p < .002)
(Table  32). Examination  of  the  standardized  residuals  shows  that  in
global/national cateogry there is a lower representation of low civic
engagment  subjects  (-1.6); in  personal  category  there  is  an higher
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representation  of  low  civic  engagment  subjects  (2.9)  and  a  lower
figure for high civic engagment subjects (-1.7).
Table 32.
CIVIC ENGAGMENT_TOT
OVERALL RECOGNITION SCORE
DIFFUSED GLOBAL/NATIONAL PERSONAL Totale
LOW
Conteggio 25 14 11 50
Conteggio atteso 24 21,3 4,7 50
Residui stand. 0,2 -1,6 2,9
MID
Conteggio 25 23 2 50
Conteggio atteso 24 21,3 4,7 50
Residui stand. 0,2 0,4 -1,2
HIGH
Conteggio 22 27 1 50
Conteggio atteso 24 21,3 4,7 50
Residui stand. -0,4 1,2 -1,7
Total
Conteggio 72 64 14 150
Conteggio atteso 72 64 14 150
χ2 (4) = 17.40, p < .002. The standard 
residuals greater than 1.7 are 
highlighted in bold.
The correlations between the production score with the Civic engagment
scores are presented in the Table 33.  “ Totally self-interest response”
(A1+A2+A3) is   negatively  related  to  Associations  involvement (r=
-0.22, p < .01),  Active citizen involvement ( r = -0.31, p < .01) and to
overall  civic engagement score ( r = -0.28, p < .01).  “Internalized but
not  up-reasoned  response”  (C2+D2) does  not  show  any  significant
correlations.   The  “full  understanding  response  of  common good”
(C3+D3) is positively related to  Active citizen involvement (r= 0.24, p < .
01) and to overall civic engagement score (r=0.17, p < .01).
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Table 33.
ORIENTATION TO THE
COMMON GOOD - REASONED
SCORE CIVIC ENGAGMENT
ASSOCIATIONS
INVOLVEMENT
ACTIVE CITIZEN
INVOLVEMENT
CIVIC
ENGAGMENT_TOT
B1_C1_D1 0,038 -0,076 -0,115
A1_A2_A3 -,219** -,310** -,282**
C2_D2 0,105 0,098 0,106
C3_D3 0,057 ,240** ,172*
*p  < .05; **p <.01
A  chi-square  test  was  applied  to  determine  whether  overall  reasoned
score  and  “civic  engagment  complessive  score”  were  associated.
Results showed that there is a significant association (χ2 (4) = 20.8, p < .
0001)  (Table  34).  Examination  of  the  standardized  residuals  showed  a
higher representation of high civic engagment subjects (1.9) in high
comprehension  category  and,  contrary,  a  tendency  to  an  high
representation  of  low  civic  engagment  subjects  (2.5)  in  low
comprehension category. 
The other values crosstabs relative to overall reasoned score are not
singificant.
Table 34.
CIVIC ENGAGMENT COMPLESSIVE
SCORE
OVERALL REASONED SCORE
low Diffused High Totale
low Conteggio 13 27 10 50
Conteggio atteso 6,7 34 9,3 50
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Residui stand. 2,5 -1,2 0,2
mid
Conteggio 4 43 3 50
Conteggio atteso 6,7 34 9,3 50
Residui stand. -1 1,5 -2,1
high
Conteggio 3 32 15 50
Conteggio atteso 6,7 34 9,3 50
Residui stand. -1,4 -0,3 1,9
Total
Conteggio 20 102 28 150
Conteggio atteso 20 102 28 150
χ2 (4) = 20.8, p < .0001. The standard 
residuals greater than 2 are highlighted in 
bold.
d. DISCUSSION
Growing,  the adolescent becomes more independent and aware of  the
consequences of his own actions, interfacing with ordinary situations that
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may require a broad orientation towards the common good.  In public ethic
situations, different common good interests can contrast with one another,
suggesting  that  the  social  structure  needs  to  which  people  refer,  may
diverge  from  a  person’s  own  priorities  and  interests,  and  hence  high
common good orientations may not be assumed.  In these contexts, the
experiences and the reasoning process through which people pass are
central as they form the foundation for future civic engagement and foster
a sense of responsibility towards society and community.
The present study, consistent with studies related to behaviour oriented
towards others (Schwartz, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002), confirmed
all  the initial  hypotheses,  evidencing as key personal  values  both
self-transcendence  and  self-enhancement  values. Positive
correlations  were  shown of  self-transcendence  values  (universalism
and  benevolence)  and  negative  correlations  of  self-enhancement
(power and hedonism) with high level of orientations to common good
(national  and  global).   Up  reasoned  category  of  common  good
correlated positively only with universalism – both “internalized” and
“full understanding” response of common good –  and negatively – only
“full understanding” response – with power and hedonism.  Conversely,
again  in  agreement  with  the  initial  theoretical  assumptions,  personal
orientation to the common good showed a positive correlation with
self-enhancement (power and hedonism) and negative correlation with
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self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence). The “totally
self  response”  of  common  good  correlated  negatively  with
universalism and positively with hedonism and power.
It  was  also investigated the correlation of  civic  moral disengagement
with orientation to the common good,  considering it  as an essential
variable to be taken into account. Consistent with the expectations, the
more people deactivated their internal moral control the more they denied
high  level  orientations  towards  the  common good.   In  particular,  civic
moral disengagement correlated positively with personal orientation
and negatively with global orientation.  Relatively to reasoned score,
civic  moral disengagement had high positive correlation with “full
understanding  response”  and  negative  correlation  with  low  level
understanding of common good.  The “internalized response” seems to
be completely uncorrelated with civic moral disengagement.
Finally,  as  highlighted  in  the  second  chapter,  the  different  theoretical
approach  of  perspective  taking  and  moral  reasoning  (Mead,  Piaget,
Kohlberg,  Selman)  that  was  taken  as  a  reference,  believed  that  an
important prerequisite to moral development was socio-moral experience.
The  findings  seem  to  confirm  this  assumption.   Orientation  to  the
common good showed a positive correlation with civic engagement.
In particular, the results show a higher positive correlation of “active citizen
involvement”  (i.e.  activities  such as:  “sign a petition to  support  a  good
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cause”,  giving  money  to  a  political  or  social  campaign”  and  so  on)
compared  to  “associations  involvement”  (frequency  of  participation  in
association and group activities outside school such as cultural or artistic
associations,  voluntary  associations,  political  associations  and  so  on).
These findings seem to indicate that simple participation in terms of
time spent is less relevant than the possibility to experiment the self
through  social experiences in the large group.  As highlighted in the
previous Study 2 referring to socio-economic status, it would appear that
even  civic  engagement  seems to  have  greater  influence  in  preventing
lower levels of the common good.  Nonetheless, such engagement does
not appear sufficient to ensure high level development of common good.
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